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SUMMARY 
 This dissertation is a comprehensive study of financial slack’s roles in municipal 
finance. Drawing theories and hypotheses in various fields of disciplines, the dissertation 
explores both the causes and impacts of financial slack accumulation in municipal 
government. Based on organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, I first examine 
whether tax revenue volatility along with other risk factors in a city’s fiscal structure 
increase municipal financial slack accumulation. Using the generalized method-of-
moment estimation, I analyze a panel dataset composed of 2,160 individual American 
cities in 50 states from years 2003 to 2011. The findings that tax revenue volatility and 
other risk factors increase municipal financial slack accumulation provide evidence to 
support organization theorists’ argument that cities that face more risk factors need more 
financial slack to hedge against the risks.  
 I then examine financial slack’s impact on municipal expenditure stabilization. 
Using the first-differenced equation model to analyze the same dataset used in the 
previous chapter, I find that the change of a city’s accumulated financial slack always 
counteracts the change of its expenditures, suggesting that financial slack stabilizes 
municipal expenditures when revenues fluctuate—it provides fungible financial resources 
when a city faces a revenue shortfall and it absorbs additional revenues when a city 
experiences a revenue surplus. Further, the findings indicate that financial slack’s 
expenditure stabilization role is more important when a city experiences revenue 
shortfalls. These findings support organization theory’s view on financial slack that it 
works as an effective tool to manage risks and fluctuations in municipal finance.   
 
 
xii 
 
 Lastly, I examine financial slack’s role in managing municipal cash flows. 
Municipal governments often use internal financial resources (i.e. accumulated financial 
slack) and external financial resources (i.e. short-term debt) to manage cash flow 
fluctuations. The pecking order theory posits that firms have a preference order over 
financial resources: internal funds come first, followed by debt, and then equity. I extend 
the application of pecking order theory from firms to local governments and test whether 
municipal governments also have this preference order. I use the Heckman Selection 
Model to analyze 478 California cities between 2003 and 2011. I find that financial slack 
reduces both the probability and the amount of municipal short-term debt. This finding 
suggests that municipal governments prefer internal financing over external financing.  
 In all, this dissertation goes beyond the conventional research focus on financial 
slack—its expenditure stabilization role. The dissertation examines both the causes and 
impacts of financial slack in municipal finance. Findings from this dissertation provide 
evidence to support organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, improving our 
understanding of government financial resources allocation between spending and saving. 
Findings from this dissertation also indicate that financial slack is an effective 
management tool to smooth expenditure volatility and cash flow fluctuations.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: FINANCIAL SLACK IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE 
 
1.1 Managing Municipal Finance in Turbulent Economic Times 
In the United States, there are over 19,000 municipalities hosting over 80 percent 
of the total population.1 These municipal governments provide local residents with 
essential public goods and services such as police and fire protection, electricity, water 
and sewage, garbage and sanitation services, public transit systems, and public 
recreational facilities. They also serve as local economic engines providing the necessary 
infrastructure, safe environment, and educated workforce upon which business flourishes. 
Due to the important roles municipal governments, especially cities have played and are 
expected to continue playing in the economy, this dissertation is devoted to the study of 
American cities.  
Financial resources are the lifeblood of public goods and services provisions by 
city governments. The availability and stability of public financial resources directly 
shape many of the outcomes that matter to the public. Over the past hundred years, as 
many American cities have gradually changed their dependence on stable revenue 
sources such as the property tax to more volatile revenue sources such as the income and 
sales taxes, these cities’ revenues became less predictable. The volatile tax revenues pose 
a big challenge to city officials in maintaining the provision and quality of public goods 
                                                          
1 Sources: “Census Bureau Reports There Are 89,004 Local Governments in the United States.” United 
States Census Bureau. Last modified August 30, 2012. 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/governments/cb12-161.html. (Accessed on February 
1, 2016). “2010 Census Urban Area Facts.” United States Census Bureau. 
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafacts.html. (Accessed on February 1, 2016).  
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and services without disruption. This challenge is greater during turbulent economic 
times, especially when the overall economy experiences a recession. During the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, many municipalities experienced increasingly financial stress. 
Some cities that experienced extremely severe financial hardship came close to financial 
collapse, as illustrated by City of Detroit. To manage municipal finance under fiscal 
stress, municipal government managers respond in the following ways: (1) reducing local 
services, furloughing or laying off employees; (2) raising taxes, service charges and/or 
fees; (3) canceling or delaying infrastructure projects; and/or (4) using accumulated 
financial slack to fill in the budget gap (Hoene and Pagano 2011). Reducing local 
services and increasing revenues by raising taxes can be politically costly and cause 
public dissatisfaction. Canceling or delaying infrastructure projects is simply postponing 
the current problems to the future. Financial slack is an alternative tool for city officials 
to manage municipal finance in turbulent economic times. Researchers have quite 
different views on the accumulation and usage of financial slack by government. In 
general, public choice economists portray governments as slack-maximizing and 
leviathan-like bureaucracies. They are concerned that accumulated slack might encourage 
inefficiency, satisficing, political rent seeking, and agency problems. In contrast, 
organization theorists view slack as a crucial buffer against risks. They believe that slack 
could increase an organization’s capacity in absorbing shocks and reducing the 
disruptions of service delivery or the need for core structural changes.  
What roles does financial slack play in municipal finance? What factors affect a 
city’s financial slack accumulation? Is slack accumulation driven by governments’ slack-
maximizing nature assumed by the public choice theory or a precautionary financial 
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management behavior explained by the organization theory? How does accumulated 
slack influence a city’s financial performance regarding expenditure stabilization and 
borrowing decisions? This dissertation explores the roles of financial slack in municipal 
finance, especially how it works as a financial management tool to help municipal 
officials manage their cities’ finances. 
1.2 Municipal Financial Slack and Its Measures 
1.2.1 Organizational Slack and the Debates 
Slack is a concept that appears in various fields of disciplines and has been 
developed with reference to firms, governments, nonprofit organizations, and other 
institutions. In general, slack is defined as the excess resources available to an 
organization, which may include excess liquidity, redundant employees, unused 
capacities, discretionary capital expenditures, and public services provided in excess of 
those required (Cyert and March 1963). In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses 
to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Hirschman (1970, 15) argues that slack 
exists in any organization such as family, firm, political party, or nation. The human 
society has a natural tendency to accumulate slack—slack “is continuously being 
generated as a result of some sort of entropy characteristic of human, surplus-producing 
societies”.  
Organizational slack is anathema to the conventional economic theory. Within 
this paradigm, scholars believe that slack represents waste and ideally there should be no 
slack. Slack causes price increase with given quality or a quality decline with given price. 
This market inefficiency could be corrected through dissatisfied customers’ “exit” that 
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forces firms to reduce slack or through “voice” that attempts to influence management 
and/or public opinions (Hirschman 1970). Regarding slack in the public sector, since 
Niskanen (1971) published the book Bureaucracy and Representative Government, a 
group of public choice economists portray governments as slack-maximizing 
bureaucracies. They believe that bureaucrats have the incentive to maximize the 
difference between revenue and the minimum cost of production. The difference becomes 
slack and it is then turned into over-supply of public goods or non-productive 
expenditures that the bureaucrats desire, such as increased salary and benefits, more 
administrative expenses, and extra personnel (Breton and Wintrobe 1975; McGuire, 
Coiner, and Spancake 1979; Blais and Dion 1990; Wyckoff 1990; Duncombe, Miner, and 
Ruggiero, 1997; Garrett 2001). Therefore, taxpayers need to use institutions to constrain 
the growth of the “Leviathans” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Oates 1985; Caplan 2001) 
or to introduce competition into the public sector to reduce agency problems (Miranda 
1994; Boyne 1998).  
The organizational theorists have quite different views compared to the public 
choice economists. They argue that when making resource-allocation decisions, short-
term efficiency should not be made without considering the long-term effectiveness. 
Organizational slack is a crucial buffer that allows an organization to adapt to internal 
pressure for adjustment and external pressure for changes in policies and environment 
(Bourgeois 1981). Slack reduces the potential disruptions of services delivery or the need 
for core structural changes (Cyert and March 1963; Bourgeois 1981; Sharfman et al. 
1988). Slack facilitates innovation by relaxing organizational control and allowing 
organizations to experiment with new strategies (Levinthal and March 1981; Singh 1986; 
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Bromiley 1991; Nohria and Gulati 1996). Moreover, slack helps organizations to take 
advantage of unexpected opportunities (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984).  
In this dissertation, I draw theories and studies on slack from various fields of 
disciplines and apply them in the context of municipal government. Taking an 
organizational perspective, I attempt to explore the effectiveness of financial slack as a 
management tool that facilitates municipal government officials in managing their cities’ 
finances. I am particularly interested in the roles of financial slack (as opposed to non-
financial slack) which refers to slack resources that are accounting based and can be 
measured objectively (Mishina, Pollock, and Porac 2004; Bradley, Shepherd, and 
Wiklund 2011) because it is visible, manageable, measurable, and accessible.  
1.2.2 Municipal Financial Slack and Its Measures 
Financial slack occurs quite often in sub-national governments. For the majority 
of the sub-national governments in the United States, one primary feature of their 
budgeting and financial management is the balanced budget requirement. Some state 
governments require that the governor’s proposed budget must be balanced; some require 
the budget that the legislature passes must be balanced; and some require the budget must 
be balanced at the end of a fiscal year or biennium, and no deficit should be carried 
forward.2 In reality, governments’ actual revenues and expenditures rarely equal their 
                                                          
2Source: “Executive Summary on State Balanced Budget Requirements” National Conference of State 
Legislature. Updated 12 April, 1999. http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-balanced-budget-
requirements.aspx (accessed on March 14, 2015). 
 
In the United States, local government’s authority is granted by its state government. State government 
allows certain local discretionary authority, regarding its structure, functions, finances, and personnel 
management. The narrowest discretionary powers are given to finances. (See: “Local Government 
Authority” National League of Cities http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-
101/city-powers/local-government-authority). So far, there is no national survey on municipal adoption of 
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estimated numbers in the budgets. In a particular fiscal period (for example a fiscal year), 
if a government’s actual revenues exceed actual expenditures, the excess of revenues 
over expenditures becomes financial slack. Many governments begin their budget 
preparation six months before the start of a new fiscal year; some even earlier (e.g., 
twelve months). Due to the long period between budget preparation and budget 
implementation, there inevitably involves some degree of errors in budget estimates. For 
example, revenue collections depend on a number of factors such as economic condition, 
population growth, employment, intergovernmental aid policies, to name just a few. Each 
of these factors is subject to change and can be difficult to estimate accurately. 
Expenditure estimation is also based on many factors out of the control of management. 
Activities that were planned may not take place. A natural disaster may cause a large 
increase in unexpected spending. Whatever the reason, they cause the actual revenues or 
expenditures deviate from the estimated numbers. These estimation errors are random 
and unintentional.  
Budgeters and government officials sometimes build slack into budget estimates 
intentionally. Regarding revenue forecasting, researchers find evidence of systematic 
underestimation of revenue. For example, Beckett-Camarata (2006) finds that the City of 
Canton, Ohio underestimated its tax revenues by an average of 4.7 percent over the 
period of 1993 and 1999. The tendency toward underestimating revenues in Canton, Ohio 
is not a unique case. A number of studies have found similar evidence of systematic 
revenue underestimation in state and local governments (Bretschneider, Bunch, and Gorr 
                                                          
the balanced budget requirement. Given that municipal governments are allowed the narrowest 
discretionary powers in their finances, it is reasonable to assume that most of the municipal governments 
follow the balanced budget requirement as their state governments do.   
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1992; Rodgers and Joyce 1996; Voorhees 2006). This tendency is probably motivated by 
a concern of potential shortfalls in actual revenue collection. In terms of expenditure 
estimation, budgeters and government officials tend to overestimate expenditures to an 
acceptable degree so that once the actual expenditures exceed the budget, they could use 
financial slack created by expenditure overestimation to make adjustment instead of 
implementing a mid-year cutback or raising taxes which is undesirable both fiscally and 
politically. Researchers have found evidence that local governments use the expenditure 
overestimation strategy in their budgets. For example, Hulpke and others find that many 
school districts in the San Francisco Bay Area overestimated expenditures (Hulpke, 
Watne, and Waldo 1976). Larkey and Smith (1989) study budget forecasting in San 
Diego, Pittsburgh, and the Pittsburgh School District. They reveal a similar tendency that 
on average, these local governments overestimated expenditures by 2 to 3 percent 
between the 1940s and the 1980s. Estimation errors caused by intentional revenue 
underestimation and expenditure overestimation are called “conservative forecasting 
bias” (Mushkin and Lupo 1967; Rose and Smith 2012). The conservative forecasting 
biases together with the random estimating errors explain why financial slack often 
occurs in municipal government finance. 
When financial slack occurs, some governments establish formal funds, such as 
rainy day funds, budget stabilization funds, or other types of reserve funds to keep their 
financial slack. Almost all state governments have established at least one of such funds 
to keep all or a proportion of their financial slack (Thatcher 2008). Unlike state 
government, the majority of municipal governments in the U.S. do not have formally 
established reserve funds. They seem to prefer keeping financial slack in fund balances 
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(Allan 1990). Wolkoff (1987) surveyed 27 largest cities (based on populations) and found 
that only 7 of them had a formal rainy day fund during the time of his survey. Marlowe 
(2012) updated Wolkoff's survey in a recent study, and found that in 2009, 11 of these 27 
cities had a formal rainy fund. However, lacking a formally established rainy day fund or 
stabilization fund does not mean that these governments have no financial slack. 
Researchers find that many local governments maintain considerable amount of slack in 
their fund balances (Marlowe 2005; Hendrick 2006; Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012; 
Wang 2015). 
Fund balance is the difference between a government’s current assets and current 
liabilities at the end of a fiscal year, reflecting what is left over after the fund’s assets 
have been used to meet its liabilities. Traditionally, state and local governments report 
financial statements arranged around a series of funds in their Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFRs). Each fund is a self-balancing account that records specific 
aspects of a government’s financial activities. The number of funds a government 
operates varies. In general, there are three major categories of funds: governmental funds, 
proprietary funds, and fiduciary funds. Proprietary funds are used to account for 
activities that are run on a business-like basis, such as an airport owned by a government. 
Fiduciary funds contain resources that the government holds for others. Thus money in 
fiduciary funds belongs to the ultimate recipient, not the government holding it. Funds in 
the fiduciary funds category often include: private purpose trust funds, investment trust 
funds, pension funds, and agency funds. Governmental funds account for everything else, 
and they are the typical funds operated by most governments. Five funds are included in 
the governmental fund types: general fund, special revenue funds, capital projects funds, 
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debt service funds, and permanent funds. Among them, the general fund is often the 
largest among governmental funds, and it is also where most basic and important public 
services can be found, such as police and fire, sanitation, social services, and so on. Some 
small municipal governments report most or all transactions in the general fund. Due to 
the importance of the general fund in municipal finance, it receives the most attention and 
scrutiny from elected officials, citizens, credit rating agencies, and capital market 
analysts. The structure of major funds operated by state and local governments is 
demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Structure of Major Funds Operated by State and Local Governments 
 
Municipal Government 
Governmental Funds 
General Fund 
Special 
Revenue Fund 
Capital Projects 
Fund 
Debt Service 
Fund 
Permanent Fund 
Proprietary Funds 
Enterprise 
Fund 
Internal 
Service Fund 
Fiduciary Funds 
Private Purpose 
Trust Fund 
Investment 
Trust Fund 
Pension Fund 
Agency Fund 
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 Researchers have used various measures of financial slack in their studies, 
including cash balance (Gianakis and Snow 2007; Gore 2009), stabilization funds 
(Gianakis and Snow 2007; Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015), fund balance 
(Hembree, Shelton, and Tyer 1999; Hendrick and Crawford 2014), unreserved general 
fund balance (Marlowe 2005; Hendrick 2006), and unrestricted net assets (Marlowe 
2011). Cash balance is the end-of-year cash and market securities a government 
maintains. Even though cash and market securities represent the most liquid form of 
governmental assets, they are not a good measure of a government’s financial slack. 
Governments often impose restrictions on their financial resources. A considerable 
proportion of cash and securities may be reserved to debt service funds, pension trust 
funds, or other types of reserve funds which government managers have no discretionary 
authority other than their dedicated purposes. Therefore, if cash and securities carry legal 
restrictions, they cannot be considered as slack. In addition, the end-of-year cash and 
market securities reported by the Census Bureau include cash balances in the general 
fund and all other funds. Using that definition of cash balance as a measure of financial 
slack tends to overestimate a government’s discretionary financial capacity in managing 
the general fund.  
 The stabilization fund is not a good measure of municipal financial slack either. 
As previously discussed, state governments generally establish formal stabilization funds 
or rainy day funds to keep their financial slack; however, very few cities do so. Many city 
governments maintain a considerable amount of slack in their fund balances. Therefore, 
using stabilization funds or rainy funds may underestimate municipal governments’ 
financial slack level. In addition, since state laws that regulate local stabilization funds or 
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rainy day funds vary tremendously, and more than half of the states have no explicit laws 
in this area (Ványolós 2009), these local stabilization funds have different names, 
dedications, and deposit/withdrawal rules. The lack of uniformity of local stabilization 
funds creates a challenge for conducting a nationwide study.  
 An alternative measure of financial slack is fund balance, which is the difference 
between assets and liabilities of various funds (see Figure 1) reported in the government’s 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). CAFRs are end-of-year financial 
documents that consist of a set of thorough and detailed financial statements of a state, 
municipal, or other governmental entities. Information reported in individual CAFRs is 
audited by an independent public accounting firm or a state audit elected or appointed by 
the state government, usually on an annual basis. The auditing firm or state office 
certifies that the financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and are free from material 
misstatement. Therefore, financial information reported in CAFRs is generally 
considered to be accurate, consistent, comprehensive, and relatively comparable.  
 Among the various funds governments operate, the general fund is most important 
because it is usually the largest fund and includes most of the essential public services. 
The general fund balance is often reported as reserved and unreserved fund balance, as 
required by the GAAP set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 
When the general fund balance is reserved, it means that the resources are legally limited 
for particular purposes such as debt service and capital replacement. The reserved general 
fund balance should not be considered as a government’s financial slack. If the general 
fund balance carries no restrictions on its future use, it is called unreserved general fund 
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balance. The unreserved general fund balance (UFB) thus is an appropriate measure of a 
government’s available resources under government officials’ management discretion. 
Further, the general fund balance is reported on a modified-accrual basis of accounting 
that focuses on short-term or in other words, liquid financial resources. Therefore, the 
UFB reflects a government’s available and liquid financial resources for operations.  
 CAFRs also report the net assets of governmental activities in the government-
wide financial statements.3 The net assets are the difference between a government’s total 
assets and total liabilities.4 Like the general fund balance, part of the net assets may be 
subject to restrictions beyond government managers’ control. Net assets that carry no 
restrictions are call unrestricted net assets (UNA), which researchers sometimes use as a 
financial slack measure. The UNA reflects a government’s overall available resources, 
both liquid and those inherent in a government’s long-term condition. UNA includes 
long-term assets such as land, improvements, and constructions in process that are not 
easily converted to liquid financial resources quickly. Using UNA as a financial slack 
                                                          
3The funds financial statements could barely provide a complete picture of the financial activities and 
financial condition of a government. First, these funds use different accounting methods. For example, the 
proprietary and fiduciary funds use accrual basis accounting, whereas the governmental funds use the 
modified accrual accounting. Second, some financial activities occur between funds. Simply adding funds 
together may double-count these activities. To compensate the missing information from the separate funds 
financial statements, the GASB Statement 34 requires state and local governments to report the 
government-wide statements that bring all financial activities together in one place using one type of 
information—information reported under the accrual-based accounting. The government-wide statements 
organize information by whether it relates to governmental activities or business-type activities. Generally 
speaking, the governmental activities are those accounted for in the governmental funds and the internal 
services. The business-type activities are typically synonymous with the enterprise funds. The 
governmental and business-type activities combine to represent the total primary government.  
4In June 2011, the GASB renamed “net assets” as “net position” in its Statement No. 65. The Statement No. 
65 amends the net assets reporting requirements in the Statement No. 34 by standardizing the presentation 
of deferred inflows and outflows of resources. The GASB Statement No. 65 took effect after December 15, 
2011. Since the purpose of this section is to review and assess financial slack measures used in prior 
studies, I use “net assets” in the discussion to keep consistent. (See “Summary of Statement No. 63”, the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Pronouncement_C&pagename=GASB%2FPronounceme
nt_C%2FGASBSummaryPage&cid=1176158736800).   
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measure may overestimate a government’s immediately available financial resources that 
allow government officials’ management discretion in their daily operations. In addition, 
UNA is reported based on the accrual basis of accounting. Under the accrual accounting, 
revenue is recognized when it is earned, realized or realizable. For example, governments 
can report revenues before they receive the cash if they reasonably expect the cash will 
be received in the near future. This also suggests that using UNA as a measure tends to 
overestimate a government’s liquid and immediately available financial slack. In this 
dissertation, I explore how financial slack works as a management tool that offers 
government officials discretionary power and the flexibility when managing their cities’ 
finances in turbulent economic times. For such a study, a financial slack measure that 
reflects a government’s liquid and immediately available financial resources is more 
appropriate. Therefore, I use unreserved general fund balance (UFB) as the financial 
slack measure in this dissertation.    
1.3 Research Questions 
In the corporate finance and financial management literature, researchers address 
why firms accumulate slack and whether slack resources promote or hinder firms’ 
successful performance (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984, Jensen 1986; Sharfman 
et al. 1988; Pasour Jr 1989; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1994; Phan and 
Hill 1995; Harford 1999). In the public finance and government financial management 
literature, studies on how slack resources influence government finance and financial 
management blossomed in the 1990s and early 2000s. These studies almost exclusively 
focus on state government (Poterba 1994; Sobel and Holcombe 1996; Knight and 
Levinson 1999; Joyce 2001; Hou 2003, 2004; Wagner and Elder 2005; Hou and 
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Duncombe 2008), with a few exceptions on local government, and even fewer on 
municipal government (Tyer 1993; Hembree, Shelton, and Tyer 1999; Marlowe 2005; 
Hendrick 2006; Gianakis and Snow 2007; Gore 2009; Marlowe 2011; Hendrick and 
Crawford 2014; Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). Table 1 summarizes the empirical 
studies on municipal financial slack in last three decades. This table suggests that most of 
these studies use samples of cities in one state or a particular metropolitan area, raising a 
concern of external validity of the findings. So far, we know relatively little about slack 
accumulation by American cities across the nation: what is the national average level of 
financial slack accumulated by American cities? Are there any general patterns of 
financial slack accumulation among cities in different regions? What are the determinants 
of municipal financial slack accumulation? How does financial slack affect municipal 
financial management with respect to spending and borrowing? Does financial slack act 
as a balancing device that helps stabilize municipal expenditures? Does the accumulated 
slack reduce a government’s short-term debt issuance? This dissertation attempts to 
address these questions. Drawing from theories and literature in public finance, public 
and corporate financial management, economics, and organization and strategic 
management, this dissertation explores the roles of financial slack in municipal finance in 
two primary perspectives: the determinants of financial slack accumulation and the 
impacts of financial slack in municipal finance. I examine these two perspectives in three 
chapters that cover municipal revenues (Chapter Two), municipal expenditures (Chapter 
Three), and municipal securities (Chapter Four).  
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Table 1. Summary of Previous Findings in Municipal Financial Slack 
Author Sample Period Financial Slack Measures Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Hembree et al. 
(1999) 
514 cities in North Carolina  1997 Average fund balance/General fund 
expenditures 
n/a n/a 27.0% 266.0%a 
89 cities in South Carolina 
n/a n/a 26.0% 151.0% 
Marlowe (2005) 103 cities in Minnesota 1990-
2000 
Unreserved general fund balance/Total 
current expenditures 
24.5% 42.2% -68.5% 576.9% 
Total general fund balance/Total 
current expenditures 
53.1% 56.1% -44.2% 689.0% 
Hendrick (2006) 264 municipal governments in 
the Chicago Metropolitan area 
1997-
2003 
Unreserved general fund balance/Total 
noncapital spending 
59.8% 79.6% n/a n/a 
Gianakis and Snow 
(2007) 
351 municipal governments in 
Massachusetts 
1995-
2002 
Stabilization fund/Total revenues 6.4% 8.4% n/a n/a 
Free cash balance/Total revenue 5.9% 5.3% n/a n/a 
Gore (2009) 9413 municipalities  in the 
U.S. 
1997-
2003 
Year-end cash balance/Monthly 
operating and interest expenditures 
10.4 8.4 n/a n/a 
Hendrick and 
Crawford (2014) 
265 municipal governments in 
the Chicago Metropolitan area 
1997-
2009 
Fund balance/Total Operating 
Spending 
82% 88% -98% 1,564% 
Snow et al. (2015) 239 municipal governments in 
Massachusetts 
1993-
2010 
Log of real stabilization fund balance 
per capita 
147.0 206.0 n/a n/a 
Note: a. For cities that operate their own electric utilities, the minimum and maximum fund-balance-to-expenditure ratios are: 25% and 71%. 
          b. This table only includes empirical studies on financial slack in municipal governments, excluding studies that focus on other types of local governments 
 such as counties, school districts, and special districts governments.  
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Why do municipal governments accumulate financial slack? Is slack 
accumulation driven by governments’ slack-maximizing nature assumed by the public 
choice theory or a precautionary financial management behavior explained by the 
organization theory? Chapter Two takes an organizational perspective to examine how 
risk factors, particularly tax revenue volatility affect a city’s financial slack accumulation. 
This chapter first presents an overall picture of municipal financial slack accumulation in 
the United States. It then proceeds to explore the determinants of a city’s financial slack 
level. In organization theory, slack is viewed as a cushion against risks. An organization 
exposed to more risk factors needs more cushion. In municipal governments, the 
volatility of tax revenues is a risk factor because it threatens government operations and 
the consistency of service provision. According to this theory, municipal governments 
with volatile tax revenue streams should accumulate more financial slack. Chapter two 
examines how tax revenue volatility and other risk factors in municipal finance affect a 
city’s financial slack accumulation.    
The next two chapters are devoted to exploring the potential impacts of the 
accumulated financial slack on municipal financial performance and management. For 
most municipal governments, the primary goal is to provide citizens with essential public 
goods and services with good quality that commensurate with the taxes they paid. This 
goal is often interrupted by expenditure instability caused by the volatile tax revenues 
and/or the business cycles. Due to limited fiscal authority, municipal governments cannot 
implement monetary policies or certain types of fiscal policies as the federal government 
does. To stabilize expenditures in face of volatile revenues, governments often use 
financial slack or issue short-term debt as budget-balancing devices. Most state 
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governments have established formal funds for the purpose of expenditure stabilization. 
Unlike state governments, municipal governments more often rely on financial slack 
stored in the form of unreserved general fund balance (UFB) to manage expenditure 
fluctuations. Chapter Three examines financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role in 
municipal finance.  
Chapter Four explores the other budget-balancing and cash flow management 
device—short-term debt. All governments face the challenge of day-to-day cash flow 
problem. A mismatch between cash flow-ins and flow-outs can cause temporary cash 
shortfalls in a government’s daily operations. To smooth the temporary deficit, municipal 
governments can use either internal resources such as financial slack or external 
resources such as short-term borrowing if their state governments do not prohibit local 
short-term debt financing. If a municipal government has the option to use either tool, 
which one will it prefer? Chapter Four applies the pecking order theory in the 
management and corporate finance literature and examines whether municipal 
governments also have a pecking order preference when choosing between internal 
financing (using financial slack) and external financing (using short-term debt) in their 
financial management. The primary research question is: does financial slack reduce 
municipal short-term borrowing? Using the Heckman selection model, this chapter tests 
the following hypotheses: (1) financial slack reduces a municipal government’s 
probability to issue short-term debt; and (2) municipal governments with more financial 
slack tend to issue less short-term debt.  
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1.4 Potential Contributions 
This dissertation is a comprehensive study of financial slack in municipal finance. 
Drawing literature broadly from different disciplines, this dissertation examines both the 
factors that affect municipal financial slack accumulation and the impacts of accumulated 
slack on municipal expenditures and short-term borrowing. The research is designed to 
cover three key areas of municipal finance: municipal revenues; municipal expenditures; 
and, municipal securities. This dissertation extends the scope of studies on slack 
accumulation from U.S. state governments to local governments, specifically, municipal 
governments. The empirical analysis is based on data from multiple sources. The sample 
includes cities of fifty states over periods of economic upturns and downturns. Results are 
thus expected to have greater external validity. This dissertation contributes to the 
increasing literature on municipal financial slack accumulation, local counter-cyclical 
expenditure stabilization, and municipal short-term debt financing. Findings from this 
study will shed light on the roles of financial slack in municipal finance and financial 
management. This dissertation is expected to improve our understanding of managing 
financial slack accumulation and using financial slack as a management tool to achieve 
better outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TAX REVENUE VOLATILITY AND MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL SLACK 
ACCUMULATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
How much money municipal governments have saved may concern taxpayers. 
Excessive slack accumulation may indicate that taxpayers are either paying unnecessarily 
high taxes or other charges, or they are not receiving an adequate return on their tax 
dollars in service and facilities. Insufficient savings on the other hand, may leave 
government managers too little financial flexibility to respond to unanticipated events, 
leading to possible disruptions of service delivery or frequent changes of tax rates. So far, 
there is no universally accepted optimal financial slack level. Many government officials 
follow rules of thumb to manage and evaluate their governments’ financial slack 
accumulation. A commonly cited standard recommends that governments should 
maintain rainy day funds approximately five percent of general fund expenditures. 
Although there is no clear indication of the original source of this recommendation, the 
‘five-percent rule’ is often cited as the adequate size of the rainy day funds (Joyce 2001). 
Credit rating firms also seem to support this ‘five-percent rule’ by citing it in the rating 
criteria (Seymour 2014). The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) does 
not agree that the ‘five-percent rule’ should apply to all municipal governments. In their 
recommended ‘best practices’, the ‘five-percent rule’ fits only the needs of very large 
municipalities while for the majority of municipal governments, the appropriate 
benchmark is an unrestricted general fund balance of no less than fifteen percent (or two 
months) of regular general fund operating revenues or expenditures (Gauthier 2009). 
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 Empirical research on municipal financial slack accumulation reveals that cities in 
the United States maintain financial slack at much higher levels than the recommended 
benchmarks. In addition, the financial slack levels vary considerably among these cities 
(see Table 1). What contributes to the variations of municipal financial slack levels? 
What determines a city’s financial slack accumulation? Kriz (2002, 2003) identifies four 
major drivers of financial slack accumulation: revenue growth, revenue volatility, desired 
expenditure growth, and the interest earned on invested fund balances. In the economic 
and management literature, volatility is analogous to the concept of risk. Organization 
theorists, following Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality concept (1947) and Cyert and 
March’s seminal work A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963), argue that risk can be 
hedged against by organizational slack. Slack provides an organization the flexibility to 
respond to uncertainties. It increases an organization’s capacity in absorbing fluctuations 
and reduces the potential disruptions of service delivery or the need for core structural 
changes (Cyert and March 1963; Bourgeois 1981; Sharfman et al. 1988). If their 
argument holds, organizations that face more risk factors should accumulate more slack. 
This chapter of the dissertation tests this argument by examining how risk factors, 
especially tax revenue volatility affect a city's financial slack level. It is one of the few 
studies that use a nationwide sample of cities to study the determinants of municipal 
savings. Findings from this chapter offer a new perspective to view municipal tax 
portfolios and their impact on municipal finance. This chapter also sheds light on the 
determinants of municipal financial slack accumulation, providing empirical evidence to 
move the current understanding of slack accumulation beyond the simple rules of thumb, 
such as the ‘five-percent’ rule. 
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 This chapter proceeds in six sections: following the first section of introduction, 
section two analyzes the causes and costs of tax revenue volatility, ways to management 
volatility, and its measures. Section three introduces data sources, describes the national 
sample, and presents an overview of financial slack accumulation by American cities. 
Section four introduces the variables, presents a model of municipal financial slack 
accumulation, and explains the appropriate methods for the analysis. The last two 
sections interpret empirical results and outline the implication of this work for the theory 
and practices of municipal financial management. 
2.2 Managing and Measuring Tax Revenue Volatility 
2.2.1 The Causes and Costs of Tax Revenue Volatility 
Governments generally arrange their activities based on the amount of revenues 
they expect to receive. In most municipal governments, the primary own-source revenues 
that support general government activities are taxes. Municipal governments draw tax 
revenues from a variety of local economic activities. Therefore, tax revenues are largely 
driven by economic growth. Researchers use volatility to describe the extent to which tax 
revenues fluctuate over the course of business cycles (Felix 2008). The traditional view 
of tax specialists argues that there is an inherent trade-off between revenue growth and 
volatility (Groves and Kahn 1952). According to this view, some taxes are more sensitive 
to economic changes, such as corporate income tax, personal income tax, and sales taxes. 
These taxes tend to grow faster than the economy but fluctuate more over the business 
cycles, causing tax revenues to be unstable (Groves and Kahn 1952; Wilford 1965; White 
1983; Felix 2008). Nevertheless, recent studies show that the trade-off between growth 
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and volatility is not as acute as was once thought. Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2006) find that 
the combination of tax base, rate structures, and policies have a bigger impact on tax 
revenue volatility than tax types. 
 Tax revenue volatility causes undesirable consequences in government and the 
overall economy. From a government management perspective, unstable tax revenues 
lead to unsustainable expenditures and/or frequent changes in tax rates, which adds to the 
challenge of governmental budgeting and financial management. From the 
macroeconomic perspective, volatile tax revenues intensify the business cycles. During 
economic growth, spending increase and tax cuts add force to booms; whereas during 
economic downturn, spending cuts and tax increase deepen cyclical busts (Poterba 1995; 
Levinson 1998; Thompson and Gates 2007). Economists also use the ‘feedback loop’ to 
describe the interaction of tax revenue volatility and the business cycles. On one hand, 
economic shocks lead to tax revenue volatility through the impacts on wages, profits, and 
consumption; on the other hand, volatile tax revenues increase the uncertainty of 
government expenditures and tax policies, leading to increased uncertainty for firms and 
consumers.  
2.2.2 Managing Tax Revenue Volatility 
Local governments face more challenges to soften revenue volatility in the 
business cycles, because they have relatively limited fiscal authority compared to the 
federal government and they are restricted from implementing monetary policy or certain 
kinds of fiscal policies as the federal government does. Nevertheless, modern financial 
and management theories provide some tools for local government to manage tax revenue 
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volatility. Researchers decompose volatility into unsystematic volatility and systematic 
volatility (Thompson and Gates 2007). The former refers to random volatility which can 
be partially managed through revenue diversification; the latter reflects changes in 
accordance with the economic conditions which can be managed through hedging and 
buffering strategies. 
Effective revenue diversification is widely accepted as a way of reducing revenue 
volatility. This idea originates from the modern portfolio theory proposed by Harry 
Markowitz (1952). The insight of this theory is that portfolio volatility is determined by 
the covariance of individual securities’ risks (also called volatility). An investor can 
reduce portfolio risk by holding the combination of securities that are not perfectly 
positively correlated. The modern portfolio theory encourages scholars in public finance 
to shift their focus from the volatility of individual taxes to the appropriate tax structure 
or tax portfolio—the mix of taxes within a governmental jurisdiction. They find that the 
volatility of a tax portfolio depends on how each tax co-varies with each other in a tax 
structure (White 1983; Gentry and Ladd 1994). A government can reduce the overall tax 
revenue volatility or even diversify away volatility by carefully selecting a combination 
of taxes with varying degrees of volatility. Such an overall tax structure would have to 
include taxes that were not perfectly correlated, so that the impact of revenue decline 
from one tax on the overall tax revenues is minimized because other taxes would not 
change in the same direction. This view differs substantially from the traditional view 
that greater revenue growth is inherently associated with greater volatility in tax 
revenues. It provides a strong theoretical foundation for the revenue diversification 
practice in government.   
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Tools to manage the second component of volatility—the systematic volatility—
include hedging and buffering strategies. The hedging strategies refer to using revenue 
flows of the same size and opposite volatility to offset the loss the other revenue. This 
strategy is conceptually similar to the use of futures and options contracts. Currently, a 
number of states, municipalities, and public retirement systems have used financial 
derivatives to hedge against budgetary risk, such as Texas’ government hedging program 
on natural gas revenues (Bowsher 1994; Swidler, Buttimer, and Shaw 1999; Thompson 
and Gates 2007).  
The buffering strategies refer to using accumulated financial slack as a financial 
management tool. When tax revenue growth exceeds economic growth, the excess of 
revenues are kept as financial slack, preventing excessive expenditure growth in 
economic boom years; when a revenue shortfall occurs, the accumulated financial slack 
fills in the gap, buffering against the need of spending cuts or tax increase. As argued by 
O’Toole and Meier, financial slack “protect(s) their organizational systems from 
unanticipated and unpleasant disruptions to maintain performance in the face of 
adversity” (2010, 342). Compared to those hedging strategies such as using financial 
derivatives, using financial slack to manage budgetary risk is more common among U.S. 
local governments and has a longer history.  
2.2.3 Measuring Tax Revenue Volatility 
Conceptually, tax revenue volatility is similar to the variance of revenues over 
time. Groves and Kahn (1952) estimate tax revenue volatility by regressing log tax on log 
income. The coefficient on log income measures revenue-income elasticity. Larger values 
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of the elasticity coefficient indicate greater volatility. Researchers later pointed out that 
Groves and Kahn’s coefficient is more of a measure of long-run growth rather than 
volatility which refers to short-run behavior (Williams et al. 1973; Dye and Merriman 
2004). For example, a government with a rapidly growing population will have a large 
revenue-income elasticity coefficient suggesting large over-time revenue volatility, even 
though its year-to-year tax yields have little fluctuation. To capture the year-to-year 
revenue fluctuation, White (1983) measures volatility by the degree to which the actual 
revenue differs from the predicted revenue. The predicted revenue is assumed to follow a 
linear trend and can be estimated with simple econometric forecast by regressing revenue 
on time. Although these forecasts may not be unbiased estimates of actual municipal tax 
revenues, they may be reasonable proxies (Dye and Merriman 2004). In practice, 
budgeters and legislators usually base their revenue estimation on typical growth patterns 
in tax revenues. In other words, local government budgeting is based on the assumption 
of predicable and steady growth over time, which is also called budget incrementalism. 
Furthermore, the underlying economic conditions (generally measured by gross state 
product or gross regional product) where tax revenues are based on tend to grow at a 
close to constant rate. Therefore, the predicated tax revenues could be considered as a 
function of time trend, and estimated from the following regression:  
𝑅𝑖,?̂? = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (1) 
Due to the concern of negatively skewed distribution of tax revenues in the 
dataset and for the convenience of interpretation, I convert tax revenues into the natural 
logarithmic form before running the regression. 𝑅𝑖,?̂? is therefore the predicated natural 
logarithm of total tax revenues for city i in year t; 𝛼𝑖 is the constant for city i; 𝛽𝑖 is the 
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linear trend parameter for city i; t is the time variable indicating year; and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the 
random error term. The regression is estimated using city and year fixed effects with state 
dummy variables to control for unobservable across-city and across-state differences and 
time-invariant factors.  
Tax revenue volatility is then calculated from the absolute deviations between the 
actual and predicated log of total tax revenues divided by the predicated log of total tax 
revenues expressed in the following model: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
|𝑅𝑖,?̂?  − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡|
𝑅𝑖,?̂?
× 100                                                              (2) 
 As such, this volatility measure captures the short-run variability of the tax 
revenues for city i in year t around its own growth trend in revenues. Greater value 
indicates greater volatility. This volatility measure is well accepted and often used in 
studies on revenue or expenditure volatility (Marlowe 2005; Carroll 2009; Wang and Hou 
2009). I use short-run volatility measure to study the impacts of tax revenue volatility on 
municipal financial slack accumulation for two reasons: first, the dissertation focuses on 
liquid and immediately available financial slack, which provides municipal government 
officials’ flexibility to cope with challenges when managing their cities’ finances. The 
research questions addressed are mostly management issues that are short-run focused. 
Second, the time span of the dataset is nine years. It is not appropriate to calculate long-
run volatility measures based on this relatively short time period. In the next section, I 
introduce the data sources for this study, basic descriptions of the sample, and some 
statistics of municipal financial slack accumulation. 
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2.3 Data Sources, Sample Descriptions, and an Overview of Financial Slack 
Accumulation by American Cities 
2.3.1 Data Sources 
Most studies on municipal financial slack use samples of cities in one or two 
states or in a particular metropolitan area as shown in Table 1. One possible obstacle that 
prevents researchers from conducting a nationwide study on municipal financial slack is 
data availability. The unreserved general fund balance (UFB) is reported in municipal 
governments’ Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). Not every state 
requires their local governments to prepare and report audited CAFRs that comply with 
GAAP; and not every city that prepares CAFRs makes them publicly accessible. 
Therefore, it is difficult for researchers to compile the CAFR-based information of local 
governments across the nation. 
Luckily, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) has been 
collecting key data elements from CAFRs submitted by governmental entities for its 
Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Award Program 
(CAFR Program) in its Financial Indicators database since 1995. A governmental entity 
is eligible for the CAFR Program if its CAFR complies with the GAAP and includes all 
funds and component units, regardless of the entity’s size and financial condition. 
Therefore, governmental entities included in the GFOA’s Financial Indicators database 
are not necessarily in better financial positions or larger in size because the eligibility 
requirements of this award program focus on the quality of CAFR reporting. Since all 
governmental entities in the Financial Indicators database use the same accounting basis, 
financial information in this database is more consistent and comparable than any other 
 
 
33 
 
publicly available source. The average number of award-winning municipal governments 
included in this database is over 1,900 in the recent three fiscal years (fiscal years 2012 to 
2014).5 
The GFOA’s Financial Indicators database provides key information on 
municipal financial slack and total revenues and expenditures in the general fund. It does 
not report detailed revenues by source, expenditures by functions, debt outstanding, and 
cash and investment positions. The U.S. Census Bureau collects and reports such 
information in its State & Local Government Finances database. The Census Bureau has 
surveyed state and local governments annually since 1967. The Census Bureau conducts 
a census every five years (years ending in ‘2’ and ‘7’), and surveys a sample of state and 
local governments in the intervening years. The financial information reported in the 
Census Bureau’s State & Local Government Finances database reflects all governmental 
activities. This is different from the fund financial statements in CAFRs that only report 
financial activities within each fund (e.g. the general fund).   
2.3.2 Sample Descriptions 
 In order to create a panel dataset that includes both the financial slack information 
and details of revenues, expenditures, and debt, I merge the GFOA’s Financial Indicator 
database with the Census State & Local Government Finances database. I use ‘municipal 
name’ in the same state as the identifier and ‘population’ as the verifier to match cities in 
the two databases. The time span of this study is from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2011 
                                                          
5 Source: Government Finance Officers Association. “Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in 
Financial Reporting Program (CAFR Program).” http://www.gfoa.org/coa (accessed on February 5, 2016). 
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in order to avoid potential inconsistency of the financial slack measure.6 The combined 
dataset includes 15,980 observations of cities in all fifty states of nine fiscal years. I 
check for missing observations and obvious data entry errors for those variables which 
will be used in later analysis. Instead of excluding missing observations in the analysis, I 
obtain information from available sources to fill in the missing values. For example, for 
the 17 cities with missing population, I am able to find the population information for 10 
of them from the statistical sections in their CAFRs or from the Census’ or their 
governments’ websites. For the rest of the 7 observations, I fill in the missing cells with 
the average population of the prior and the following years. 
 To check for potential data entry errors, I examine those observations whose total 
general fund revenues, total general fund expenditures, unreserved general fund balances, 
and populations have changed by over 100 percent from year t-1 to year t. I identify over 
200 of such observations. I then compare the values of the above four variables reported 
in the Financial Indicators database and the numbers reported in the CAFRs that I obtain 
from those cities’ websites. Except for a few cities that actually experienced significant 
changes in revenues, expenditures, UFB, and population due to fund balance transfers, 
municipal consolidation, and many other reasons, most of the identified cases involve 
data entry errors. The primary cause of data entry errors is mistreating dollar value with 
                                                          
6 GASB Statement No. 54 changed the reporting requirements on general fund balance, effective from 
2012. Prior to this change, the general fund was reported ‘as reserved’, ‘designated’, and ‘unreserved.’ The 
Statement No. 54 requires that fund balance should be reported as ‘non-spendable’, ‘restricted’, 
‘committed’, ‘assigned’, and ‘unassigned.’ The new fund balance categories are not directly compatible 
with the old categories. For example, the sum of committed, assigned, and unassigned fund balances under 
the new reporting system does not necessarily equal the unreserved fund balance under the old reporting 
system, because some proportion of the committed or the assigned fund balances might be reserved 
depending on different accounting treatments. To keep the UFB measures consistent, I restrict the time 
period between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. 
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thousands of dollar value, or vice versa. I replace the wrong data entries with correct 
information reported in their CAFRs, rather than to exclude these observations as some 
researchers did (Marudas 2004; Gore 2009; Calabrese 2011). I delete 22 observations 
with missing values or data entry errors that I could not obtain information to correct 
them. After data cleaning, the combined dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of 15,958 
observations for 2,160 individual cities with an average 7.4 years of data points. 
The combined dataset biases towards larger cities. As is shown in Table 2, my 
GFOA and Census combined dataset includes almost exclusively urban cities. Therefore, 
findings from this chapter should not be generalized to all cities, but larger urban cities in 
the United States. This fact does not devalue this combined dataset and this study because 
larger cities serve larger populations, and research findings from samples of larger urban 
cities may potentially inform fiscal decision making that affect more people. 
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Table 2. Comparing the Sizes of Cities in the Databases (Fiscal Year 2010) 
  GFOA Database Census Database GFOA & Census Combined 
Total Observations 1,863 3,512 1,861 
Population Range Min: 58 Max: 8,391,881 Min: 1    Max: 8,274,527 Min: 58 Max: 8,391,881 
% of Rural Townsa (Popu<2,500) 1% 20% 1% 
% of Urban Citiesb (Popu>=2,500) 99% 80% 99% 
% of Urban Clustersa (Popu: 2,500 ~50,000) 67% 62% 67% 
% of Urbanized Areasa (Popu>=50,000) 32% 18% 32% 
Mean Population of All Cities 71,575 41,136 71,798 
Mean Population of Urban Cities 72,596 51,222 72,638 
a. U.S. Census Bureau’s definition. Source: http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_urbanrural.html. Accessed on March 7, 2015. 
b. U.S. Department of Agriculture’s definition. Source: Source: http://ric.nal.usda.gov/what-is-rural. Accessed on March 7, 2015. 
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2.3.3 An Overview of Financial Slack Accumulation by American Cities 
Before proceeding to explore the factors that affect a city’s financial slack 
accumulation, I first present some descriptive statistics to show an overall picture of 
financial slack accumulation by American cities. I use unreserved general fund balance 
(UFB) as a percentage of total current expenditures to measure a city’s financial slack 
level. Figure 2 illustrates the trend of financial slack accumulation by the 2,160 cities of 
fifty states throughout the study period in my sample. The trend demonstrates a clear pro-
cyclical pattern: during economic expansion (fiscal years 2003 - 2007),7 cities increased 
their financial slack levels, and the accumulated UFB peaked when the economy reached 
its summit in 2007. The UFB drained away quickly in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. 
When the U.S. economy recovered from recession, the UFB accumulation slowly 
recovered as well. On average, during the nine years of economic ups and downs, 
American cities in the sample maintained UFB about 21 percent of their total current 
expenditures (or equal to 2.5 months of total current expenditures). This national average 
financial slack level is close to but slightly above the GFOA’s recommended benchmarks 
(i.e. 15 percent or two months of operating expenditures). This finding is comparable to 
Marlowe (2005)’s finding of 24.5 percent based on a sample of Minnesota cities.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Source: The National Bureau of Economic Research. “US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.” 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.Accessed on January 15, 2015. 
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Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation) 
Figure 2. Overall Trend of Municipal Financial Slack Accumulation by American Cities 
(UFB%) 
 
Prior studies have found that smaller cities tend to have higher financial slack 
levels (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). To examine the relationship between city size 
(measured by population) and financial slack levels, I group cities by population quartiles 
and by key city definitions according to the Census Bureau and the United States 
Department of Agriculture. Results in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are consistent with findings 
in prior studies: on average during the study period, small cities (cities that fall into the 
first quartile) maintained financial slack level over twice as high as the financial slack 
levels in large cities (cities that fall into the fourth quartile); rural towns kept financial 
slack levels over five times higher than those in urbanized areas.   
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Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation) 
Figure 3. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and City Size (by Population Quartile) 
 
 
 
Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation) 
Figure 4. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and City Size (by City Definition) 
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Geography matters for economic activities, which is the central idea of economic 
geography. Cities in the same region may have similar climate, natural resources, 
economic activities, industries, political and fiscal institutions, and population density, to 
name a few. The shared similarities in the above factors may lead to commonly shared 
municipal financial management practices in the same regions. To examine whether cities 
in the same region show any pattern in slack accumulation, I segment the United States 
into eight economic regions following the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s 
definition. The BEA’s definition of regions is primarily based on cross-sectional 
similarities in their socioeconomic characteristics, and thus is appropriate for this study. 
Figure 5 illustrates the eight major economic regions in the United States. Analysis of 
municipal financial slack accumulation and economic regions reveals some interesting 
patterns. Figure 6 shows that cities in the New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, and VT) 
and the Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, and PA) regions8 accumulate far less financial 
slack than cities in the rest of the United States. On average, cities in the Southwest 
region (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, and WV) have the highest 
financial slack levels, almost three times as much as those in the New England region.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Altogether, the two regions are called the Northeast Region by the Census Bureau. 
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Source: “Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions” Iowa State University’s website 
http://www.icip.iastate.edu/maps/refmaps/bea (accessed on April 7, 2016). 
Figure 5. Eight Major Economic Regions in the United States 
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Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation) 
Figure 6. Municipal Financial Slack (UFB%) and Economic Regions 
 
The above descriptive information suggests that municipal financial slack levels 
are affected by the overall economic condition, city size, and some observable and 
unobservable regional factors. Besides these, what else contribute to the variation of 
municipal financial slack accumulation? In the next section, I present a model of 
municipal financial slack accumulation, and discuss the appropriate methods for the 
regression analysis. 
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2.4 Variables and Model Specification 
Organization theorists view slack resources as a crucial buffer against risks. Slack 
increases an organization’s capacity in absorbing fluctuations. It gives managers more 
administrative flexibility to respond to uncertainties, risks, and goal conflicts among 
political coalitions (Cyert and March 1963; Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984; 
Sharfman et al. 1988). This view explains the rationale that organizations accumulate 
financial slack. Organizations that face more risk factors need to accumulate more 
financial slack in order to have the capacity to respond to potential uncertainties and 
risks. Managers in such organizations are motivated to accumulate financial slack to 
increase their management flexibility. Built on this risk-slack hypothesis, the model of 
municipal financial slack accumulation incorporates tax revenue volatility as the 
independent variable and several control variables that are hypothesized to affect a city's 
financial slack accumulation. The primary research question is: does greater tax revenue 
volatility lead to more financial slack accumulation in American cities? 
2.4.1 Variables 
The dependent variable is UFB as a percentage of total current expenditures, 
labeled as “Slacki,t.” This variable reflects the amount of immediately available and 
fungible financial resources of an individual city i in year t. These financial resources are 
under municipal government officials’ discretionary power when they manage their 
cities’ finances. The independent variable—tax revenue volatility—is calculated from 
equation (2) which reflects a city’s short-run variability of the total tax revenues in a 
particular year. This variable is labeled as “Volatilityi,t.” 
 
 
44 
 
In addition to tax revenue volatility which is expected to increase a city’s 
financial slack accumulation, risk (or protective) factors inherent in a city’s fiscal 
structure are also taken into account in the model. On the revenue side, over dependence 
on intergovernmental revenues is a risk factor because the amount of aid and the time of 
aid disbursements are not under the control of municipal government officials 
(Reschovsky 2004; Hendrick 2006). To make things worse, state and county 
governments often reduce the amount of aid or delay aid disbursements to deal with their 
own fiscal stress during economic recessions when municipal governments are in greater 
need of such revenues (Hoene 2009). I use the percentage of revenues received from state 
and county governments out of total municipal revenues to measure this factor. I 
hypothesize that cities with greater dependence on intergovernmental revenues are likely 
to accumulate more financial slack. This variable is labeled as “IG Revenuei,t.” 
In contrast, revenue diversification is often advocated as a risk-reduction financial 
management strategy. The common approach to measuring revenue diversification is to 
use a reversed Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Hendrick 2002; Carroll 2005, 2009; Yan 
2012). I calculate this index based on three major revenue sources: total tax revenues, 
total intergovernmental revenues, and total charges and miscellaneous revenues. Rj 
represents the proportion of each of the three major revenue sources in total revenues. 
Calculation of revenue diversification is shown in equation (3). The value of this index 
ranges from 0 to 1 with increasing values indicating greater revenue diversification. 
𝑅𝐷 =  
1−∑ 𝑅𝑗
23
𝑗=1
1− 
1
3
                                                                               (3) 
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Non-discretionary expenditure categories may motivate government officials to 
save slack, because these spending items constrain their management flexibility in coping 
with unanticipated events. For example, if a city’s expenditure structure comprises 
largely non-discretionary expenditure categories, government officials would be 
restrained from using spending cuts to respond to revenue shortfalls. In such cases, they 
may turn to alternative management options such as using accumulated financial slack to 
fill in the budget gap. According to organization theory, non-discretionary expenditure 
categories should be viewed as risk factors inherent in a city’s fiscal structure, and are 
expected to have a positive impact on municipal financial slack accumulation. I identify 
two non-discretionary expenditure categories: debt service expenditures and salary 
expenditures. Debt service expenditures include principal retirement, interest and other 
financial charges. Government officials have no administrative authority to change, 
especially to reduce, debt service spending because the amount of this expenditure 
category was pre-set at the point when the bonds were issued. I use debt service 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures to measure this variable, and label it as 
“Debt Servicei,t.” Compared to debt service expenditures, salary expenditures are a little 
more discretionary. When a municipal government experiences extreme financial stress, 
it can choose furloughs, pay freeze, pay cut, and a few other options as many state and 
local governments did in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Nevertheless, compared to 
those discretionary expenditure categories such as parks and recreation spending, the 
money saved from these salary reduction options might be limited. The furloughs are 
mostly applied to non-essential workers, and the pay freeze or pay cut should not violate 
the laws. The layoff procedures for public sector employers are often more complex than 
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the private sector employers whose employment is purely contractual. A report shows 
that in several states, the state courts upheld the right of a city to lay off personnel for 
fiscal reasons.9 I hypothesize the share of salary expenditures of total expenditures may 
increase a city’s financial slack accumulation. But since salary expenditures are a bit 
more discretionary than debt service expenditures, I expect to see its impact on slack 
accumulation is smaller compared to the impact of debt service spending. I use salaries 
and wages paid to city employees as a percentage of total expenditures to measure this 
variable, and label it as “Salaryi,t.” 
The impact of capital expenditures on financial slack accumulation can be 
explained through two relationships: the relationship between capital expenditures and 
current expenditures, and the relationship between current expenditures and fund balance. 
Total expenditures equal the sum of capital expenditures and current expenditures, as 
expressed in equation (4). When the total expenditures level is set, there is a direct trade-
off between capital expenditures and current expenditures: an increase in capital 
expenditures results in a decrease in current expenditures. 
Total Expenditures = Capital Expenditures + Current Expenditures      (4) 
  Fund balance is the difference between total revenue and current expenditures, as 
shown in equation (5). When this equation is rearranged, equation (6) demonstrates that 
total revenue is the sum of current expenditures and fund balance. When the total 
revenues level is held constant, there is a direct trade-off between current expenditures 
                                                          
9 Source: “Public Sector Layoffs” AELE Monthly Law Journal. June 2009. 
http://www.aele.org/law/2009all06/2009-06MLJ201.pdf  (accessed on April 8, 2016). 
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and fund balance: a decrease in current expenditures leads to an increase in the UFB (i.e. 
the unreserved proportion of fund balance). 
Fund Balance = Total Revenues - Current Expenditures      (5) 
Total Revenues = Current Expenditures + Fund Balance     (6) 
Under the balanced budget requirement where total expenditures equal total 
revenues, the right hand side of equation (4) equals the right hand side of equation (6). 
The current expenditures thus links the relationship between capital expenditures and 
financial slack. When total expenditures and total revenues are held constant, an increase 
in capital expenditures results in a decrease in current expenditures (expressed in 
equation (4)); a decrease in current expenditures leads to an increase in UFB (expressed 
in equation (6)). Based on the above analysis, I expect a positive impact of capital 
expenditures on financial slack accumulation. I use capital expenditures as a percentage 
of total expenditures to measure this variable, and label it as “Capitali,t.” 
Prior studies have found that smaller cities tend to maintain higher level of 
financial slack (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). Figures 3 and 4 of this chapter also show 
the negative relationship between city size and financial slack level. One possible 
explanation is larger organizations have more connections that allow managers to have 
more options and opportunities in their management when circumstances change 
(Thompson 1967). For example, larger governments often involve greater volume of 
activities that government officials can make trade-offs among one another. Also, smaller 
cities may face more restrictions in raising money through the issuance of debt. I include 
the natural logarithm of population to control the impact of city size in the model.  
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The overall economic condition may affect a city’s finance and its financial slack 
accumulation. Researchers often use unemployment rate as an indicator of economic 
condition. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does not report unemployment rates for 
individual municipality. At the local level, it reports unemployment rates for counties, 
and cities of 25,000 populations or more, and for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 
In my sample, about 45 percent of the cities have less than 25,000 populations. And the 
complicated overlaps of jurisdictional boundaries among MSAs, counties, and cities 
make it extremely challenging to identify unemployment rate for individual cities. 
Therefore, I choose the state level unemployment rate in the model, and expect to see that 
as unemployment rates rise, municipal financial slack would decrease. Table 3 reports a 
summary of descriptive statistics of variables.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
    Dependent Variable     
Slack 20.968 47.689 -19.350 3064.748 
Independent Variables     
Volatility 5.885 4.736 0 41.806 
IG Revenue 16.235 11.932 0 90.051 
Revenue Diversification 0.857 0.116 0.078 1.000 
Debt Service 4.736 4.262 0 77.732 
Salary 29.175 10.759 0 75.580 
Capital 18.689 11.549 0 83.495 
Control Variable     
Log of Population  10.316 1.146 3.497 15.943 
Unemployment Rate 6.794 2.381 2.6 13.8 
Number of Cities: 2,160     
Average Time Span: 7.4 years 
    
Number of Observations: 15,958   
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2.4.2 Model Specification 
Based on the previous discussion, the model of municipal financial slack 
accumulation can be expressed: 
𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                           (7) 
 Where 𝜃𝑖 are city fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are year fixed effects, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term not correlated with the explanatory variables of all past, current, 
and future time periods of the same city. One immediate problem in applying the fixed 
effects to this empirical problem is that the dependent variable 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 by nature is 
strongly persistent (Wooldridge 2012, 391-395). As demonstrated in equation (8), the 
current year unreserved general fund balance is equal to the amount of fund balance 
accumulated in prior years plus any surplus or deficit in the current year; thus 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 
is highly correlated with the fixed effects in the error term, which gives rise to ‘dynamic 
panel bias’ problem (Nickell 1981).  
𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ∆𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡                                                        (8) 
 Some researchers address this dependent variable persistence problem by 
including a lagged dependent variable as an instrumental variable on the right-hand side 
of the equation. However, this causes a new problem. It inflates the coefficient estimate 
for the lagged dependent variable significantly by attributing predictive power to it that 
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actually belongs to the city’s fixed effects. If the time range were large (large T), the 
impact of one year’s shock on the city’s fixed effect would dwindle. In this study, the 
panel consists of only nine years but many cross-sections, that is, ‘small T, large N.’ 
Using the above technique on panel data with such a structure inevitably results in sizable 
estimate bias. An additional issue with this model is that some of the independent 
variables may not be strictly exogenous; that is, independent of current disturbances, they 
are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error term 𝜇𝑖,𝑡, meaning 
that these independent variables may be determined simultaneously with municipal 
financial slack accumulation.  
 The generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimators are increasingly popular 
to address the above problems in dynamic panel data analysis. This method was first 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), and later developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman 
(2009) introduces how to implement GMM analysis in Stata. The GMM estimators are 
designed for situations with 1) ‘small T, large N’ panels; 2) a linear functional 
relationship; 3) dynamic dependent variable; 3) independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous; 5) fixed effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and auto correlation within 
individuals but not across them. This method removes the individual fixed effects as well 
as any associated omitted variable bias by differencing the equation. To overcome the 
correlation between the regressors (including the lagged dependent variable), the GMM 
estimation uses lags of all endogenous variables as instrumental variables. Thus the 
GMM estimators do not require good instruments. They assume the lags are good internal 
instruments; nevertheless they do allow the inclusion of external instruments (Roodman 
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2009). This assumption is especially valuable when potential instruments are difficult or 
impossible to determine. In this case, I treat all independent variables as endogenous 
variables except state unemployment rate, log of population, and year dummies. I lag 
them by two years because the standard treatment in the GMM is lags 2 or longer if 
variables are endogenous.  
 Two GMM estimations are commonly used. One is the difference GMM, and the 
other is the system GMM. The difference GMM tends to magnify gaps in unbalanced 
panels, causing large data loss. The system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) preserves sample size in panels with gaps: instead of subtracting the previous 
observation from the contemporaneous one, it subtracts the average of all future available 
observations of a variable (Roodman 2009). Since the panel structure in this study is 
unbalanced, I use the system GMM for estimation based on the orthogonal deviations. 
The model includes year dummies to prevent the most likely form of cross-individual 
correlations—the contemporaneous correlations. This model reports robust standard 
errors adjusted by the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction without which those 
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased.  
2.5 Results 
 Table 4 reports the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimators and some essential 
statistical tests results. The F-test assesses the overall significance of the model. The F-
statistics of 14.43, significant at the .000 level suggests the overall fit is highly 
significant. The Arellano-Bond tests examine autocorrelation in the panel. As expected, 
the AR (1) z-score of -2.26 is significant at the .05 level, presenting strong evidence that 
there is first-order serial autocorrelation. The AR (2) z-score of 1.40 is not statistically 
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significant, suggesting there is no second-order serial correlation in the panel. These 
results confirm that the moment condition assumed by the system GMM is valid, and the 
second-order serial correlation does not bias the standard errors. The Hansen test checks 
for joint validity of the instruments. Significant Hansen J statistics indicates the model is 
mis-specified.10 In this case, the Hansen J statistics is insignificant, suggesting the 
instruments set in the model is appropriate.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of Municipal Financial Slack Accumulation, 2003-2011 
  Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t Statistics 
Slackt-1 0.148*** 0.035 4.19 
Volatility 5.279** 2.317 2.28 
IG Revenue 0.276* 0.166 1.66 
Revenue Diversification 4.787 23.289 0.21 
Debt Service 0.987** 0.466 2.12 
Salary 0.248* 0.136 1.82 
Capital 0.563*** 0.102 5.52 
Log of Population -8.423*** 1.457 -5.78 
Unemployment Rate 1.418 1.249 1.13 
(Results on year dummies omitted) 
Number of observations: 5,468  
Number of groups: 1,199   
Number of instruments: 250   
F(26,1198) = 14.43***    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -2.26** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = 1.40 
Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions: chi2(223) = 247.86 
Note: * significant at 0.10 level    ** significant at 0.05 level    *** significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
                                                          
10 Source: StataCorp. 2013. Stata 13 base reference manual. 
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rgmmpostestimation.pdf (accessed on March 7, 2016).  
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 The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimators provide useful information to 
understand factors that contribute to municipal financial slack accumulation. The 
regression coefficient on one-year lag of financial slack is highly significant but relative 
small in size. Recall equation (8) to interpret this coefficient: the end-of-year financial 
slack equals the beginning-of-year financial slack plus any surplus or deficits that occur 
during the current year. The one-year-lag of financial slack is actually the beginning-of-
year slack, which represents the amount of financial slack accumulated in prior years. 
The surplus or deficits that occur during the current year are the change of financial slack. 
The coefficient of .148 is thus interpreted in the following way: holding all other 
variables constant, if financial slack increases by 10 percentage points during the year, 
the end-of-year financial slack will increase by 1.48 percentage points. This means that 
municipal governments only keep less than 15 percent of the newly generated surplus in 
unreserved general fund balance. The majority of the surplus are either reserved for 
specific purposes (e.g. debt service spending, capital improvements, etc.) in future years 
or spent in the current year. This finding goes against the public choice’s argument that 
governments by nature are slack-maximizing bureaucracies (Niskanen 1971; Brennan 
and Buchanan 1980; Oates 1985).  
 As expected, volatile tax revenues as a risk factor imposes a positive impact on a 
city’s financial slack level. Holding other variables constant, 1 percentage point increase 
of tax revenue volatility raises a city’s financial slack level by 5.3 percentage points. This 
finding is consistent with what Gore (2009) finds using a different revenue volatility 
measure (i.e. coefficient of variation) and a different financial slack measure (i.e. the end-
of-year cash and market securities). In Gore (2009)’s study, the coefficient of variation is 
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the ratio of standard deviation of total revenues divided by the total average revenues 
over the prior four years. She reveals a significant positive impact of revenue volatility on 
a city’s cash holdings. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond coefficient on tax revenue 
volatility in this study together with Gore’s finding confirm the hypothesis that cities with 
more volatile tax revenues tend to accumulate more financial slack.  
 The coefficient on IG Revenue is positive, suggesting a possible relationship that 
dependence on intergovernmental revenues, as a risk factor in a city’s revenue structure, 
may lead to increased financial slack accumulation. This coefficient is at the .10 level. In 
Hendrick (2006)’s study, she uses pooled OLS regression and finds that dependence on 
intergovernmental revenues reduces a city’s financial slack. Hendrick’s finding 
contradicts her hypothesis that the share of intergovernmental revenues and financial 
slack level should have a positive relationship. She explains that it is possible that 
municipalities do not recognize dependence on intergovernmental revenues as a risky 
condition. Her estimates based on pooled OLS might be biased. As discussed in section 
2.4.2 “Model Specification”, using OLS regression to analyze a dataset with a dynamic 
panel structure will produce bias estimates. How intergovernmental revenues affect a 
city’s savings needs further exploration. The other revenue factor—Revenue 
Diversification—which is often considered as a risk-averse management strategy, does 
not show any significant impact in the model. This factor also needs further 
investigations in future studies.  
 Non-discretionary expenditure categories are considered as risk factors in a city’s 
expenditure structure. According to the risk-slack hypothesis, they are expected to 
impose positive influence on municipal financial slack accumulation. The statistically 
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significant and positive coefficients on the two non-discretionary expenditure 
categories—Debt Service and Salary—confirm the hypothesis. As expected, since debt 
service expenditures were pre-set which offers government officials little room to 
implement spending discretion, government officials tend to accumulate more financial 
slack if their municipal governments have heavier debt service spending burden. Holding 
other variables constant, 10 percentage points increase in the share of debt service 
expenditures raises financial slack accumulation by 9.9 percentage points. Salary 
expenditures though considered as a non-discretionary expenditure category, still allows 
government officials some management flexibility. When a government experiences 
extreme fiscal stress, government officials can exercise their discretion to change the 
amount of expenditures on salaries and benefits in response to severe financial challenges 
through ways such as furloughs, lay-offs, pay cut, pay freeze, benefit changes, and other 
methods. Because salary expenditures’ non-discretion feature is not as strong as debt 
service expenditures, the coefficient on Salary is smaller. A 10-percentage-points 
increase in the share of salary expenditures raises financial slack by 2.5 percentage 
points.   
 The coefficient on Capital indicates a positive relationship between capital 
expenditures and municipal financial slack accumulation, consistent with my hypothesis. 
Holding other variables constant, a 10-percentage-points increase in capital expenditures 
is associated with a 5.6-percentage-points increase in financial slack accumulation. The 
impact of capital expenditures on financial slack accumulation is linked through current 
expenditures. The relationships of the three variables are expressed in equations (4), (5), 
and (6) in section 2.4.2.  
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 The last variable in the model that demonstrates a significant impact on municipal 
financial slack accumulation is city size measured by log of total population. Consistent 
with my hypothesis and findings in prior studies (Hendrick 2006; Gore 2009), larger 
cities accumulate less financial slack. The coefficient on log of population shows that all 
else equal, as total population increases by 10 percent, UFB as a percent of total current 
expenditures decreases by 8.4 percent.   
2.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter of the dissertation addresses an important question in municipal 
finance: what factors affect municipal financial slack accumulation? Built on 
organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis, this chapter examines whether tax revenue 
volatility leads to an increase in financial slack accumulation. To test this hypothesis, I 
create a combined dataset that include municipal financial slack information and details 
in municipal revenues, expenditures, and debt positions. This dataset provides an avenue 
to study how factors, especially those risk factors inherent in a city’s fiscal structure, 
affect its financial slack level. This dataset includes cities in fifty states over a period of 
time before and after the Great Recession. Findings from this study have greater external 
validity than studies that use samples of cities in one state or one metropolitan area. The 
use of proper method—the system GMM for small T, large N dynamic panel—also 
guarantees that findings from this study are reliable and robust.  
 The findings that tax revenue volatility and other risk factors in a city’s fiscal 
structure such as dependence on intergovernmental revenues and non-discretionary 
expenditure categories increase municipal financial slack accumulation support 
organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis that organizations with more risk factors need 
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more financial slack to hedge against them. The finding that municipal governments only 
keep 15 percent of newly generated surplus as financial slack provides evidence against 
public choice scholars’ argument that governments are slack-maximizing bureaucracies. 
These findings suggest that municipal financial slack accumulation is not primarily 
driven by governments’ slack-maximizing nature, but rather more of a precautionary 
financial management strategy to react to the risk factors inherent in their fiscal 
structures.  
This chapter provides a basis for further assessing why governments accumulate 
financial slack. Yet there is still a tremendous gap in the understanding of local 
government slack accumulation, regarding the rationales, the motivation, the optimal 
level, and the impacts (both intentional and unanticipated). Such research is necessary if 
our current understanding on appropriate level of financial slack needs to move beyond 
the simple rules, such as the conventional ‘five-percent’ rule or the GFOA recommended 
benchmarks on local financial slack accumulation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL SLACK AND MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE STABILIZATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the United States, municipal governments are on the frontline to provide vital 
public goods and services that affect people’s daily life, from police and fire to sanitation, 
road maintenance, public recreation facilities, and community centers for the elders. They 
also provide the necessary infrastructure, safe environment, and civilized work force 
upon which business flourishes. Financial resources are the lifeblood of these public 
goods and services. The availability and stability of public expenditures directly shape 
many of the outcomes that matter to citizens and local economy. 
Municipal governments generally decide how much they spend based on the 
amount of revenues they expect to collect. Thus stable and predictable revenues help 
achieve the expenditure stabilization goal. The property tax has the feature of relatively 
stable yield and resistance to the business cycles. Mikesell and Liu (2013) find that 
during the Great Recession of 2007-2009, property tax collections remained surprisingly 
stable while collections from other major local taxes declined significantly. Despite the 
property tax’s stable yield nature, American cities have gradually changed their 
dependence on property tax to more volatile revenue sources such as income and sales 
taxes over the past hundred years. This change in municipal tax structure causes greater 
revenue volatility which further leads to increasing expenditure fluctuations. The 
business cycles intensify revenue and expenditure volatility. Without any counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, expenditures drop dramatically in economic downturns due to revenue 
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shortfalls and grow excessively in economic upturns due to revenue prosperity. Frequent 
expenditure changes inevitably affect the sustainability and quality of public service 
provisions. Spending cuts during economic downturns (often called cutback or pullback 
policies) may cause disruption or termination of some public services (Bourdeaux and 
Hildreth 2012). This hurts those (primarily socially disadvantaged groups) who have 
greater dependence on public goods and services as they have less money available to 
pay for alternative options. The pro-cyclical expenditure fluctuations also create a so-
called ‘negative feedback loop’: spending increase and tax cuts during economic 
expansion add force to the booms; whereas spending cuts and tax increase during 
economic recession deepen cyclical busts (Poterba 1995; Levinson 1998; Thompson and 
Gates 2007; Plerhoples and Scorsone 2012). To sum up, unstable municipal expenditures 
affect not only the continuity of local public service provisions but also the health of local 
economy. Therefore, municipal governments need strategic fiscal policies or financial 
management tools to stabilize expenditures.  
In the management literature, instability or volatility is analogous to risk. 
Organization theorists argue that financial slack serves as a cushion protecting 
organizations from internal and external shocks (Cyert and March 1963; Levinthal and 
March 1981; Moe 1984). I test this proposition in Chapter Two and find that municipal 
governments with greater tax revenue volatility and other risk factors inherent in the 
fiscal system accumulate more financial slack. This finding indicates that municipal 
government officials may accumulate financial slack to buffer against risks. Do they use 
the accumulated financial slack to stabilize expenditures? This chapter examines the role 
of financial slack on municipal expenditures stabilization. The discussion proceeds in five 
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sections: following the introduction section, section two explains the role of financial 
slack in balancing the budget and stabilizing expenditures in municipal finance, as well as 
empirical findings of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization effects in subnational 
government. Section three develops a theoretical model and discusses the appropriate 
methods for the analysis. Section four introduces data sources, describes the national 
sample, and interprets the regression results. The final section implies findings of this 
study for the theories and practices of municipal fiscal administration.   
3.2 Financial Slack as an Expenditure Stabilization Tool 
 The study of municipal expenditure stabilization is rooted in the theoretical 
development of subnational government counter-cyclical fiscal policies. In the mid-
1930s, Keynes published The Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money where he 
posited that central government could implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies to 
stabilize the economy over the business cycles—government uses large-scale deficit 
spending in economic downturns to pull up aggregated demand to stimulate the sluggish 
economy. Musgrave (1959) later theorized the above government role posited by Keynes 
as one of the three basic government functions—the economic stabilization function 
(Oates 1972). The standard Musgrave theory assumes the stabilization function of 
government is exclusively a role of the central government. This view was challenged by 
Gramlich (1987) who argued that subnational governments also play a stabilization role 
to counteract the business cycles. Given that subnational governments have limited fiscal 
capacity and are constrained by fiscal and budgetary rules, subnational governments’ 
stabilization role often refers to budget or expenditure stabilization rather than economic 
stabilization (Wang and Hou 2012). The expenditure stabilization role of local 
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governments is no less important than the economic stabilization role. Stable 
expenditures are the foundation of municipal service provisions. Stable expenditures also 
mitigate the effect of ‘negative feedback loop’ which hurts the local economy.  
As the understanding of subnational governments’ expenditure stabilization role 
evolved, subnational governments realized the value of financial slack as an expenditure 
stabilization tool. Financial slack accumulation counteracts revenue ups and downs: it 
absorbs extra revenues during the boom years and provides money to offset revenue 
shortfalls in the lean years. It is a form of self-insurance on expenditures against revenue 
volatility. Some governments establish formal saving device, such as budget stabilization 
funds, rainy day funds, or other types of reserve funds. So far, almost all state 
governments have established at least one of such funds (Thatcher 2008). Local 
governments rarely establish a formal or separate budget stabilization fund. Some local 
governments are even prohibited by their state governments from having such a fund 
(Hou 2008). Instead, local governments often rely on an informal saving device—the 
general fund balance—to accumulate financial slack (Wolkoff 1987; Marlowe 2005).  
Researchers have produced a rich literature on state government expenditure 
stabilization, including the creation, use, and impacts of the rainy funds, the budget 
stabilization funds, reserve funds, the general fund balance, and other stabilization tools. 
Hou (2003) studied the expenditure stabilization effects of the budget stabilization funds 
(BSFs) and the general fund unreserved undesignated fund balances (UUBs) in state 
governments. He found that BSFs exert significant counter-cyclical stabilization effects 
on state expenditures—they bolster state spending levels during economic downturn 
years. UUBs, however, do not show observable stabilization effects. Hou concluded that 
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the BSFs’ role in expenditure stabilization overshadowed the UUBs’ role since state 
governments increasingly rely on formal counter-cyclical fiscal tools—the BSFs—to 
balance their budgets as well as to smooth expenditures. Along with Hou’s study, a series 
of studies were conducted to examine the expenditure stabilization effects of formal and 
informal savings in state governments (Pollock and Suyderhoud 1986; Gramlich 1987; 
Navin and Navin 1997; Joyce 2001; Hou 2003, 2005; Wagner 2003; Wagner and Elder 
2005, 2007). These studies have reached relatively consistent conclusions that state 
savings (i.e. financial slack) serve as stabilization device that smooth expenditures over 
the business cycles, although the stabilization effect can be limited in some cases.  
Studies on local expenditure stabilization are scarce, and findings from these 
studies are not conclusive. Marlowe (2005) first examined financial slack’s counter-
cyclical expenditure stabilization effect at the local level. Using a sample of 103 
Minnesota cities from 1990 to 2000, he analyzed the effects of three types of financial 
slack—unreserved general fund balance, designated general fund balance, and reserved 
general fund balance. He found that unreserved general fund balance has a marginal 
nevertheless important counter-cyclical stabilization effect as it boosts expenditures 
during downturn years; designated general fund balance has a pro-cyclical effects; and 
reserved general fund balance has a “siphoning” effect as it decreases positive 
expenditure gaps during economic boom years.  
Hendrick (2006) used a sample of 264 cities in the Chicago metropolitan area 
from 1997 to 2003 to study the determinants of unreserved general fund balance and its 
impacts on municipal governments’ fiscal conditions. She found a significant and 
positive relationship between unreserved general fund balance and municipal 
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expenditures, although the findings only showed significance in the full model, not for 
individual years. Even if the findings were significant for each year, a mere positive 
relationship between the two variables is not direct evidence that unreserved general fund 
balance smooths expenditure fluctuations.  
Wang and Hou (2012) examined the impact of fund balance on expenditure 
stabilization using a sample of 100 North Carolina counties for the period of 1990 and 
2007. They did not find evidence that fund balance exerts a counter-cyclical stabilization 
effect on local expenditures. Wang (2015) later extended the time span of the same 
dataset to 2011. Based on the updated dataset, he re-examined fund balance’s expenditure 
stabilization roles in the Great Recession and earlier recessions. He found that fund 
balance played a counter-cyclical stabilization role in 2005-2011, but not in 1994-2004.  
The above literature review reveals some common issues in prior studies on local 
expenditure stabilization. First, whether financial slack plays an expenditure stabilization 
role in local government finance remains an open question, as these studies show mixed 
findings. Second, external validity can be an issue since all of these studies use samples 
of cities in one state or a particular metropolitan area. For example, North Carolina has a 
conservative fiscal administration system and the state government exerts strong control 
overall the fiscal practices of its local governments, whereas Illinois state government 
gives its local governments more discretionary fiscal authority. Results from North 
Carolina counties should not be simply generalized to cities in the Chicago metropolitan 
area. Third, the time spans of these studies mostly cover periods from post-1990s to pre-
Great Recession. As Wang (2015)’s study suggests, the choice of time span may affect 
estimations.  
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 In this chapter of the dissertation, I use a dataset that consists of a sample of cities 
nationwide from 2003 to 2011 to study the roles of financial slack in municipal 
expenditure stabilization. Different from prior studies that focus on the effect of financial 
slack on local counter-cyclical stabilization through the business cycles, this study shifts 
the focus from a macro perspective of expenditure fluctuations in the economic booms 
and busts to a relatively micro perspective of the year-to-year expenditure adjustments: 
how does a municipal government adjust its expenditures to respond to a revenue change 
within a fiscal year? And what roles does financial slack play during this expenditure 
adjustment process? By focusing on the role of financial slack in the annual expenditure 
changes, this study dissects the mechanism of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization 
effects. Further, this study also provides an opportunity to observe municipal government 
officials’ management decisions when circumstances change. 
3.3 Methodology and Model Specification 
 Municipal governments generally make their expenditure decisions based on the 
amount of revenues they expect to collect. Under the balanced budget requirements 
which apply to most state and local governments,11 estimated expenditures should not 
exceed estimated revenues in the budget. As discussed in Chapter One, many 
governments begin their budget preparations several months before the start of a new 
fiscal year. During the long time between budget preparation and budget implementation, 
estimation errors are inevitable due to the complexity of economic and social activities so 
that the actual revenues rarely equal the estimated revenues. If actual revenues deviate 
                                                          
11 Source: “Achieving a Structurally Balanced Budget” The Government Finance Officers Association. 
Updated February 2012. http://www.gfoa.org/achieving-structurally-balanced-budget (Accessed on March 
17, 2016). 
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from budget estimates, municipal government officials have to adjust expenditures in 
order to keep their budgets balanced. Without any expenditure stabilization tool, the 
expenditure adjustment should equal to the revenue change; that is to say, if revenues 
drop (increase) by ten percent, spending has to be cut (raised) by ten percent. Figure 7 
presents a picture of the annual changes of total revenues and expenditures in the general 
fund of 2,160 U.S. cities between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. Each data point represents 
the difference of current year general fund revenues or expenditures of these cities 
compared to their previous year values divided by previous year total general fund 
revenues. The figure shows that except during the Great Recession when the general fund 
revenues and expenditures declined to the same extent, the overall expenditure 
fluctuation is a little smoother than the overall revenue changes, suggesting that these 
cities might have used some fiscal policies or financial management strategies to stabilize 
their expenditures.  
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Source: the combined GFOA and Census dataset (author’s calculation) 
Figure 7. Overall Total General Fund Expenditure and Revenue Fluctuations (2003-2011) 
 
 State governments generally establish a separate budget stabilization fund or rainy 
day fund to manage expenditure fluctuations. Unlike state governments, municipal 
governments more often use the general fund balance, especially the unreserved general 
fund balance (UFB), as an expenditure stabilization tool. Although scholars have found 
mixed results regarding UFB’s expenditure stabilization effect in local governments, 
some do find that UFB plays a significant role in stabilizing local expenditures over the 
course of business cycles (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015). As a financial management tool, 
UFB absorbs additional revenues when there is a budget surplus, avoiding expenditure 
expansion caused by excessive revenue growth during the boom years; when there is a 
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revenue shortfall, UFB fills in the budget gap, diminishing a dramatic spending cut 
during the lean years. UFB also works as a form of self-insurance against unanticipated 
events. For example, there might be a natural disaster or a crime wave that calls for a 
spending spike. When encountering such an event, local government officials could use 
cash or convert fungible resources such as market securities and receivables stored in the 
UFB into cash to provide additional financial resources to respond to these emergencies 
promptly and effectively. In the following part of this section, I specify a model that 
examines how the UFB serves as an expenditure stabilization tool when municipal 
governments need to adjustment expenditures in response to revenue changes.  
3.3.1 Methodology 
 A city’s expenditures are primarily determined by its revenues, and also affected 
by the unreserved general fund balance. Equation (9) expresses this relationship: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                              (9) 
where 𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the total general fund expenditures for city i in year t; 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the total 
general fund revenues for city i  in year t; 𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of unreserved general 
fund balance for city i in year t; 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents a group of observable and measurable 
control variables that affect a city’s expenditures; 𝑎𝑖 represents the unobserved time-
invariant factors (at least constant within the time span of the study period) that affect a 
city’s expenditures, such as a city’s economic base, industrial mix, form of government, 
political conservatism, the presence of certain fiscal rules and policies (e.g. balanced 
budget policy, fund balance policy, debt limit policy, etc.), and so on. The 𝑎𝑖 is 
commonly called a “fixed effect” (Wooldridge 2012, 460). The error 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is called the 
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idiosyncractic error, referring to those unobserved time-variant factors that affect a city’s 
expenditures.  
 Differencing all the variables in equation (9) over time gets the following 
equation:  
                        ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                      (10)   
where ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total general fund expenditures of city i from year t-1 
to year t; ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total general fund revenues of city i from year t-1 
to year t; ∆𝑈𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡 denotes the change of total unreserved general fund balance of city i 
from year t-1 to year t; and ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 denotes changes of each observable and measurable 
control variables in the model from year t-1 to year t. The unobserved time-invariant 
individual fixed effect 𝑎𝑖 is differenced away. Equation (10) is called the first-differenced 
equation, and the OLS estimators of βs in this equation are called the first-differenced 
estimators (Wooldridge 2012, 461). The first-differenced equation model not only 
controls for omitted time-invariant variables as the fixed effects model does, but also 
addresses the serial correlation problems. The government revenue and expenditure time 
series by nature are highly persistent (or strongly dependent), meaning that the value of 
current year expenditures or revenues is highly correlated with the previous year’s value. 
This is a reasonable concern considering that incrementalism is a traditional and common 
budget making approach among local governments. In addition, the variable UFB is also 
of high persistence because the current year UFB reflects the sum of UFB accumulated in 
all prior years and the newly generated UFB from the current year. The first-differenced 
equation model addresses serial correlation by subtracting the value of previous 
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observation from the value of current observation. After the differencing process, the 
first-differenced series is considered an independent and identically distributed sequence. 
In addition to addressing the problems of omitted time-invariant variable bias and serial 
correlation, differencing time series also removes any linear time trend in the dependent 
and explanatory variables which may bias the regression estimates (Wooldridge 2012, 
395-96). To further control the time serial effect and to capture the secular trend, I add 
year dummies in the model. 
 The first-differenced equation model has another advantage for this study—it 
explicitly examines how changes in the explanatory variables affect the changes in the 
dependent variable over the same time period. This serves well to investigate the 
proposed research questions in this chapter: how do municipal governments adjust 
expenditures when facing a revenue change and how does the change in financial slack 
help stabilize municipal expenditures during this process?  
3.3.2 Model Specification 
 Based on equation (10), I develop a first-differenced equation model that tests the 
above research questions. The model is expressed as: 
∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡
′𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼7∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
                                                                                                                                         (12) 
where ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 are changes in individual municipal government’s total 
general fund expenditures, total general fund revenues, and unreserved general fund 
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balances from year t-1 to year t, respectively. These changes are then divided by each 
city’s previous year total revenues to address heteroscedasticity or in other words, to 
make them more comparable. ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denote the change of debt 
service expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures and the change of salary and 
wages paid to city public employees as a proportion of total expenditures from year t-1 to 
year t, respectively. ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡′𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 denote the change 
of property tax revenues as a share of total revenues and the change of intergovernmental 
revenues as a share of total revenues from year t-1 to year t, respectively. 
∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 represents a city’s population growth, which is measured as the change 
of total population of city i from year t-1 to year t divided by this city’s previous year 
population. 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡 denotes the unemployment rate for state m in year 
t. As introduced in Chapter Two, due to the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics does 
not report unemployment rates for individual municipalities, and the complexity of 
jurisdictional boundaries among MSAs, counties, and cities, it is very challenging to 
identify unemployment rate for individual cities based on currently available information. 
Therefore, I use the state level unemployment rate to control for the overall economic 
condition. Lastly, I include year dummies denoted as 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 in the model to control for 
temporal variation in the dependent variable. 
The primary variables of interest are ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡. Based on municipal 
governments’ budget making process and financial management practice, changes in 
revenues (∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡) should be the primary driver of expenditure changes. I expect 𝛼1to 
have a positive sign with a value between 0 (where there is no expenditure adjustment) 
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and 1 (where expenditures adjust as much as the revenue change, indicating that the 
expected stabilization tool—UFB—does not have any impact on expenditure changes).  
I expect changes in UFB (∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡) is an important player in the expenditure 
adjustment process, although its effect may not be as strong as changes in revenues. If 
UFB plays an expenditure stabilization role in this adjustment process, ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 should 
counteract expenditure changes (∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡): an increase in ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 indicates that it absorbs 
revenue surplus, and this holds back expenditure growth, leading to a decrease in ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡. 
A decrease in ∆𝑈𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 means it releases financial slack to support expenditures, and this 
boosts up expenditure growth, leading to an increase in ∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡. The coefficient 𝛼2 thus 
measures UFB’s effect on municipal expenditure adjustments. A negative sign of 𝛼2 
indicates that UFB has an expenditure stabilization effect. Indirectly, 𝛼2 also suggests the 
tradeoff government officials have made between spending and saving. If a municipal 
government experiences a revenue increase in the current year, the change in revenues 
(∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡) indicates a revenue surplus. Municipal government officials can decide to spend 
the surplus in the current year or to save it for future use either in the form of financial 
slack or as reserves for specific purposes. The coefficient 𝛼2 thus indicates the proportion 
of the current year surplus kept as savings. A large size of 𝛼2 provides evidence that 
governments are slack-maximizing bureaucracies.  
Municipal government officials may feel different pressures when they face a 
revenue surplus or a revenue shortfall. When a city experiences a revenue increase, city 
officials need to decide whether to spend the revenue surplus in the current year or to 
keep it as savings for the future. If they decide to spend it, they may face the challenge of 
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allocating the extra money fairly among various programs and interest groups. When a 
city experiences a revenue decline, city officials have to cope with the budget deficit by 
either increasing taxes or cutting expenditures. To fill in a budget gap is often more 
challenging than to allocate extra money because raising taxes is very likely to receive 
opposition from tax payers and cutting expenditures is likely to interrupt public service 
provision which may cause citizen dissatisfaction. It is politically costly for local elected 
officials. Therefore, city officials may invest greater effort in keeping expenditures stable 
during a revenue shortfall. I hypothesize that the UFB plays a more important role in 
stabilizing municipal expenditures when a city’s revenues decline. To capture this 
possible nuance of the UFB’s expenditure stabilization effects in different situations, I 
separate the regressions in scenarios of revenue increase and decrease.  
Spending flexibility determines to what extent government officials can adjust 
expenditures to cope with revenue changes. Less discretionary expenditure categories 
offer government officials very little room to do so. I identify two less discretionary 
expenditure categories: the share of debt service expenditures in total expenditures and 
the share of salary expenditures in total expenditures. Debt service expenditures include 
principal retirement, interest and other financial charges. The amount of debt service 
expenditures was set at the time when the bonds were issued. Government officials have 
no administrative authority to change or reduce debt service expenditures even if in face 
of fiscal stress. If a city’s debt service expenditure burden increases, government 
officials’ management discretion in adjusting expenditures to cope with revenue changes 
would decrease. I expect the sign of ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is negative, and the effect of this 
variable is greater in the scenario of a revenue shortfall.  
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Salaries and wages paid to city employees are another less discretionary 
expenditure category. Though government officials can choose furloughs, pay freeze, pay 
cut, and other options when their cities experience extreme fiscal stress as many state and 
local governments did in the Great Recession of 2007-2009, it is probably not wise to use 
these salary control strategies as a regular response to revenue changes, especially small 
revenue changes. After all, recruiting new workers and job training are time consuming 
and administratively costly. I hypothesize the salary expenditure category has the same 
effect on municipal expenditure adjustments as the debt service expenditures do. Because 
salary expenditures are a little more discretionary than debt service expenditures, I expect 
the effect of salary expenditures on municipal expenditure stabilization to be smaller than 
the effect of debt service expenditures.   
The volatility of a city’s revenues directly affects its need for expenditure 
adjustments. I identify two major revenue sources that may affect municipal 
governments’ revenue volatility: property tax revenues and intergovernmental revenues. 
The property tax has low elasticity compared to other taxes (Wilford 1965; Felix 2008). 
If not constrained by certain tax limits, local government officials may be able adjust the 
millage rates in the opposite direction to offset changes in property values. Also, the 
property values are not assessed every year. Thus the changes in market property values 
are not immediately reflected in property tax collections (Mikesell and Liu 2013). The 
combination of millage rates adjustments together with the property value assessment 
lags makes property tax a stable local revenue source. This feature of property tax has 
proven to be an important advantage in economic recessions, which explains why local 
governments’ revenue collections held up better than state governments in the Great 
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Recession (Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist 2011; Alm 2013; Mikesell and Liu 2013). I 
hypothesize that cities with greater dependence on the property tax have lower overall 
revenue volatility and are thus in lower needs of expenditure adjustments. I expect the 
sign of ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 to be negative.  
In contrast, the dependence on intergovernmental revenues may add uncertainty 
in municipal revenue estimation because the amount of aid and the time for 
disbursements are not subject to municipal governments’ complete control. The delay of 
aid disbursement may create cash flow problems which increases the need of expenditure 
adjustments. To make things worse, state governments sometimes reduce the amount of 
aid or delay the disbursement during economic recessions due to their own fiscal stress 
(Reschovsky 2004; Hoene 2009).This forces municipal governments to make further 
expenditure adjustments. I hypothesize that cities with a greater share of 
intergovernmental revenues have more expenditure adjustments. The sign of 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡′𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is thus expected to be positive.  
Municipal expenditures are driven by local residents’ demands in public goods 
and services. A city with a growing population is more likely to increase expenditures on 
police, fire, public infrastructure, and so on. I include population growth 
(∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡) in the model and expect this variable to have a positive sign. 
Municipal governments’ own-source revenues are generated from the local economic 
base, and are thus affected by the overall economic condition. I use state unemployment 
rates to measure the overall economic conditions. Greater unemployment rates indicate a 
declining economy in which government expenditure growth tends to slow down. 
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Therefore, I hypothesize a higher unemployment rate (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚,𝑡) is 
associated with lower municipal expenditure growth (∆𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡).  
3.4 Sample Descriptions and Results 
This study is based on the same data set—the combined Census and GFOA panel 
data—used in Chapter Two. Details of data cleaning are described in section 2.3 in 
Chapter Two. The sample includes 15,958 observations for 2,160 individual cities of fifty 
states between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. Table 5 Panel A presents descriptive 
information about the cities in the sample. All the financial variables have been inflation-
adjusted based on the Consumer Price Index of all urban consumers published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of variables included 
in the regressions. The average change in total general fund revenues (ΔTR) is 7.4 
percent with a standard deviation of 14.6 percent, suggesting that changes in total general 
fund revenues are relatively moderate for most of the cities from 2003 to 2011. The 
average change in total general fund expenditures (ΔTE) is 6.8 percent with a standard 
deviation of 14.7 percent. The smaller average change in general fund expenditures with 
a similar standard deviation indicates that on average general fund expenditures are less 
volatile than general fund revenues during the study period.  
 Table 6 reports the first-differenced estimators from pooled OLS regressions. In 
cross-section time series data set, observations within each municipality may be 
correlated in some unknown way, inducing correlation in 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 within i. This error is often 
referred as the clustered errors. In the presence of clustered errors, OLS estimates are still 
unbiased but standard errors may be underestimated, leading to incorrect inference. To 
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address this issue, I use the Huber-White standard errors clustered by individual 
municipality which allow for intragroup correlation (Froot 1989). Numbers in 
parentheses in Table 6 are Huber-White standard errors. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of Sample Cities  
 Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Total General Fund Expenditures (’000) 94,400 1,430,000 0.401 73,100,000 
Total General Fund Revenues (’000) 99,000 1,530,000 389.942 79,200,000 
Total UFB (’000) 14,500 32,600 -320,000 922,000 
Debt Service Exps./Total Exps. 0.047 0.043 0 0.777 
Salary Exps./Total Exps. 0.292 0.108 0 0.756 
Property Tax Rev./Total Rev. 0.203 0.135 0 0.776 
Intergovt'l Rev./Total Rev. 0.162 0.119 0 0.901 
Population 69,970 258,823 33 8,391,881 
Panel B: Regression Variables 
  
 Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ΔTE 0.068 0.147 -2.035 4.469 
ΔTR 0.074 0.146 -0.953 4.797 
ΔUFB 0.033 0.174 -3.338 6.528 
ΔDebt Service -0.001 0.023 -0.236 0.508 
ΔSalary -0.004 0.068 -0.469 0.490 
ΔProperty Tax 0.003 0.037 -0.385 0.382 
ΔIntergovt'l Revenue -0.003 0.053 -0.619 0.594 
ΔPopulation 0.020 0.276 -0.912 12.883 
Unemployment Rate 6.794 2.382 2.6 13.8 
Number of Observations: 15,958   
Number of Cities: 2,160    
Average Time Span: 7.4 years 
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Table 6. Regression Results from the First-Differenced Equation Model 
 Revenues Increase  Revenues Decrease 
 
Full Moderate Increase 
(Increase < 13%) 
Large Increase 
(Increase >= 13%)  
Full Moderate Decrease 
(Decrease < 8%) 
Large Decrease 
(Decrease >= 8%) 
ΔTR 0.431*** 
(0.114) 
0.348*** 
(0.049) 
0.446*** 
(0.143)  
0.373*** 
(0.118) 
0.244* 
(0.134) 
0.303* 
(0.172) 
ΔUFB -0.088*** 
(0.026) 
-0.065** 
(0.027) 
-0.135*** 
(0.040)  
-0.107*** 
(0.033) 
-0.057* 
(0.030) 
-0.311*** 
(0.080) 
ΔDebt Service -0.056 
(0.080) 
-0.102 
(0.079) 
0.057 
(0.169)  
-0.215 
(0.152) 
-0.163 
(0.141) 
-0.570 
(0.499) 
ΔSalary -0.042* 
(0.023) 
-0.036* 
(0.022) 
-0.062 
(0.056)  
-0.144*** 
(0.051) 
-0.097* 
(0.052) 
-0.357** 
(0.144) 
ΔProperty Tax 0.072 
(0.049) 
0.011 
(0.054) 
0.245** 
(0.102)  
-0.004 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.059) 
0.033 
(0.157) 
ΔIntergovt'l Revenue 0.033 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.039) 
0.102** 
(0.086)  
0.149** 
(0.072) 
0.144* 
(0.084) 
0.203** 
(0.101) 
ΔPopulation 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003)  
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
Unemployment Rate -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.005)  
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
(Year dummies’ outputs omitted) 
Constant 0.045*** 
(0.015) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.082* 
(0.046)  
0.017 
(0.023) 
0.018 
(0.024) 
-0.064 
(0.089) 
Sample Sizes 5,597 4,401 1,196  1,278 1,035 243 
R2 0.271 0.101 0.362   0.119 0.061 0.226 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are Huber-White standard errors clustered by individual municipalities.  
          *  p < 0.1        ** p < 0.05        *** p < 0.01                        
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The first three columns of Table 6 in the table present regression estimates from 
the full sample of revenue increase, the moderate revenue increase, and the large revenue 
increase samples; the last three columns present regression estimates from the full 
revenue decrease sample, the moderate revenue decrease, and the large revenue decrease 
samples. I hypothesize that when a city experiences a large revenue change, it may rely 
more on UFB to adjust expenditure changes. I define a ‘large’ revenue change if a city’s 
revenue increase falls into the 75th percentile and revenue decrease falls into the 25th 
percentile. In other words, I choose the top 25 percent of observations with the largest 
percent revenue increase or decrease as ‘large’ revenue changes. The cutting point for 
large revenue increase is 13 percent and the cutting point for large revenue decrease is 8 
percent. 
 The first-differenced estimators provide useful information on how municipal 
expenditures change in response to marginal changes in the explanatory variables. 
Among all explanatory variables, ΔTR has the largest effect on expenditure changes. This 
confirms my hypothesis that expenditure changes are primarily driven by revenue 
changes. Holding other variables constant, when general fund revenues increase by 10 
percentage points, general fund expenditures increases by 4.3 percentage points; when 
total general fund revenues fall by 10 percentage points, total general fund expenditures 
fall by 3.7 percentage points. This positive relationship gets stronger when revenue 
changes are large. If a city has a large revenue increase, a 10-percentage-points revenue 
increase causes expenditure to rise by 4.5 percentage points. The same marginal revenue 
increase only causes expenditure to rise by 3.5 percentage points among cities with 
moderate revenue increase. The same pattern holds for cities that experience revenue 
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declines. Overall, the coefficients of ΔTR are smaller in the revenue decrease models 
than those in the revenue increase models, suggesting that municipal governments use 
more expenditure adjustment strategies to cope with revenue declines.  
 The negative coefficients of ΔUFB indicates the tradeoffs between municipal 
governments’ spending and saving: more savings accumulated in the UFB slows down 
expenditure growth, and withdrawing savings from the UFB pushes up expenditure 
growth. In the revenue increase models where municipal governments experience 
revenue surpluses, holding other variables fixed, a 10-percentage-points increase in 
ΔUFB pulls down expenditure growth by 0.9 percentage points. This suggests that the 
UFB absorbs revenue surplus, preventing expenditure growth caused by revenue 
increase. The UFB’s role in preventing expenditure growth is greater when cities 
experience larger revenue growth. In the revenue decrease models where municipal 
governments face revenue shortfalls, holding other variables fixed, a 10-percentage-
points ΔUFB decrease boosts expenditure growth by 1.1 percentage points. This indicates 
that the UFB releases financial slack to fill in the budget gap, preventing spending cuts 
caused by revenue declines. The UFB’s role in preventing spending cuts is greater when 
cities experience large revenue decrease. In all, ΔUFB always counteracts the changes of 
total general fund expenditures, suggesting it stabilizes expenditures when revenues 
fluctuate. The overall greater coefficients of ΔUFB in the revenue decrease models 
further indicates that the UFB plays a more significant role in helping municipal 
governments stabilize expenditures when they face a revenue shortfall. Since my choice 
of large revenue change is arbitrary, I conduct robustness checks by choosing alternative 
cutting points other than the two used in the regressions. For the revenue increase models, 
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I choose 10 percent and 15 percent as the alternative cutting points of large revenue 
increase; for the revenue decrease models, I choose 5 percent and 10 percent as the 
alternative cutting points of large revenue decrease. Results demonstrate consistent and 
similar patterns: municipal governments adjust expenditures to a greater extent during 
revenue decrease and the UFB plays more important roles in expenditure adjustments 
when a city responds to revenue declines. In general, the greater changes of general fund 
revenues, the greater roles the UFB plays in expenditure adjustments. 
 Expenditure categories that restrain municipal government officials spending 
discretion are expected to reduce municipal expenditure adjustments. That is to say, as 
the share of debt service expenditures and the share of salary expenditures in total 
expenditures increase, expenditure adjustments (ΔTE) decrease. Since debt service 
expenditures restrict municipal government officials’ spending flexibility more than 
salary expenditures do, I expect the size of coefficients of ΔDebt Service to be greater 
than the size of coefficients of ΔSalary. The regression estimates confirm my hypotheses: 
the negative signs of the coefficients of these two variables (except the coefficient of 
ΔDebt Service in the large revenue increase model) suggest these two expenditure 
categories restrain government officials’ spending discretion, which leads to less 
expenditure adjustments. The overall larger coefficients of ΔDebt Service than the 
coefficients of ΔSalary reflect debt service expenditures’ non-discretionary nature, 
although these ΔDebt Service regression estimates are not statistically significant. The 
non-significant estimates of ΔDebt Service are probably due to the small share of debt 
service expenditures in total expenditures and the little change of the year-to-year ΔDebt 
Service. As shown in Table 5 Panel A, debt service expenditures count less than 5 
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percent in total expenditures. Changes in such a small share in total expenditures may not 
affect government officials’ spending flexibility. In addition, Table 5 Panel B shows that 
ΔDebt Service has little variation compared to other variables. One disadvantage of the 
first-differenced equation model is that variables with little year-to-year variation cannot 
be estimated with precision. For ΔSalary, its effects on municipal expenditure 
adjustments are greater in the revenue decrease models. Holding other variables fixed, if 
the share of salary expenditures decreases by 10 percentage points during revenue 
shortfalls, municipal governments’ total general fund expenditures increases by 1.4 
percentage points. The negative signs of this variables indicate municipal governments 
adjust salary expenditures to stabilize the overall general fund expenditures.  
 A greater share of property tax revenues in total revenues is expected to stabilize 
municipal revenues, which leads to a lower need in expenditure adjustments. Regression 
estimates on ΔProperty Tax do not seem to support this hypothesis. The coefficients of 
ΔProperty Tax are positive in the revenue increase models, though only in the large 
revenue increase model the coefficient shows statistical significance. The coefficients of 
ΔProperty Tax are negative in the full and moderate revenue decrease models, and is 
positive in the large revenue decrease model. None of these estimates in the revenue 
decrease models are statistically significant. I cannot make any meaningful statistical 
inference based on these imprecise results. One possible explanation is that in states 
which have passed any form of tax and expenditure limitation rules, local government 
officials cannot change property tax rates without voters’ approval. This restricts 
government officials from adjusting the millet rates or the assessed property values to 
reach their desired property tax yields. Another possible explanation is that there is 
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relatively small year-to-year changes in property tax revenues during the study period. 
How the property tax affects municipal expenditure stabilization needs further 
exploration in future studies.  
 The effects of ΔIntergovernmental Revenue on ΔTE are relatively consistent. 
Overall, a greater share of intergovernmental revenues increases the need of expenditure 
adjustments. The effects are larger during revenue shortfalls. When a city experiences a 
revenue decrease, if its share of intergovernmental revenues increases by 10 percentage 
points, the city’s general fund expenditures would further fall by 1.5 percentage points.   
 The effect of population growth on changes in municipal general fund 
expenditures are positive when revenues rise. This confirms my hypothesis that a city 
with a growing population needs to provide more public goods and services to meet local 
residents’ growing demands, which inevitably pushes up expenditures.  
 The negative coefficients of state unemployment rate in all of the models also 
confirms my hypothesis. Increase in unemployment rate indicates a declining economy. 
Municipal expenditure growth is more likely to slow down as the overall economic 
condition gets worse. This model uses state unemployment rates to capture the impact of 
general economic conditions. This is not a precise measure of local economic conditions. 
Future studies should try to use an economic measure that matches local conditions 
better.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I examine how municipal governments adjust expenditures in 
response to changes in revenues. I find that, on average, municipal governments smooth 
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their expenditures substantially so that expenditures do not change as much as revenues 
do. I also find that financial slack (UFB) is an important expenditure stabilization tool in 
municipal financial management. Different from previous studies which examine the 
beginning-of-year UFB’s effect on expenditure stabilization over the course of business 
cycles, I shift the research focus to examine how marginal changes in the UFB help 
municipal governments stabilize their year-to-year expenditures in order to dissect the 
mechanism of the UFB’s expenditure stabilization effects. I find that changes in the UFB 
always counteract the changes of total general fund expenditures, suggesting that the 
UFB plays an expenditure stabilization role: when a municipal government has a revenue 
surplus, the UFB absorbs part of the surplus, avoiding excessive expenditure growth 
caused by revenue increase; when a municipal government encounters a revenue 
shortfall, UFB releases financial slack to fill in the budget gap, mitigating dramatic 
spending cuts. The UFB’s expenditure stabilization roles are more significant when 
municipal governments experience a revenue decrease, or when the revenue changes are 
large. These findings provide strong evidence that UFB works as an expenditure 
stabilization tool in municipal governments, complementing prior studies on local 
government counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization policies. I also find evidence that 
spending flexibility affects municipal governments’ expenditure adjustments. This 
finding provides evidence to support organization theory’s view on financial slack—it 
can be used as a cushion to buffer against the risk factors a government faces. This study 
uses the first-differenced equation model which addresses important statistical issues 
such as omitted fixed effects and serial correlations in the dependent and explanatory 
variables. The limitation of this model is that it cannot make precise estimations on 
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variables with little year-to-year change. Future studies should examine the effects of 
such variables (i.e. debt service expenditures, and property tax revenues) on municipal 
expenditure adjustments.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINANCIAL SLACK AND MUNICIPAL SHORT-TERM BORROWING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Cash flow problems are a common issue in many municipal governments. During 
the normal course of a fiscal year, the day-to-day revenue and expenditure flows of a 
governmental unit are rarely equal. Many governments receive lump sum, scheduled 
payments of major revenue sources once or twice a year, or at quarterly intervals. On the 
other hand, operating expenditures, especially recurring expenses such as personnel costs 
are roughly constant throughout the fiscal year. Figure 8 presents City of San Diego’s 
general fund cash flows to illustrate this problem. The city receives property taxes from 
the County of San Diego twice every fiscal year,12 creating two bulges in its cash flow-in 
trend: one in December and January, and the other in May and June. On the expenditure 
side, except May and July, its monthly cash disbursements are pretty constant over the 
course of the year. The consequence of the mismatch between cash flow-ins and flow-
outs is temporary cash shortfalls during a fiscal year. As shown in Figure 9, in absence of 
any cash management strategy, the City would have a negative end-of-month cash 
balance seven out of twelve months.  
 
 
                                                          
12 The property taxes paid to County of San Diego are “delinquent after December 10 and April 10, 
respectively.” The City receives its shared property taxes from the County afterwards. See City of San 
Diego’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2013, page 65. 
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Data source: 
http://www.sandiego.gov/investorinformation/documents/otherupdates/genfundsummary.shtml 
Figure 8. City of San Diego’s General Fund Cash Flows, Fiscal Year 2013 ($’000) 
 
 
 
Data Source: 
http://www.sandiego.gov/investorinformation/documents/otherupdates/genfundsummary.shtml 
Figure 9. City of San Diego’s End-of-Month General Fund Cash Balances, Fiscal Year 
2013 ($’000) 
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Managing government cash flows is not simply a technical problem, but a critical 
issue in municipal financial management. For a municipal government, failure in meeting 
its obligations of matured bond principal and interest payments or in funding 
expenditures in a timely manner could cause catastrophic problems. To manage cash 
flows, municipal governments can use either internal financial resources such as financial 
slack they have accumulated or external financing tools such as short-term borrowing if 
permitted by the state government. If both options are available, how do municipal 
governments choose between internal financing and external financing? Do they prefer 
one financing instrument to another? In this chapter of the dissertation, I apply a theory—
the pecking order theory—commonly used in corporate financial management studies 
that explains firms’ preference ranking over various financial resources in the context of 
municipal governments. I examine whether a pecking order of preference over internal 
and external financial resources also exists in municipal governments, and whether 
financial slack reduces municipal short-term borrowing. The discussion proceeds in six 
sections: following the introduction section, section two introduces the pecking order 
theory and its applications in prior research. Section three develops a theoretical model of 
municipal short-term borrowing. Section four introduces data sources, describes the 
California sample, and discusses appropriate methods. The final two sections interpret 
regression results and imply findings of this study for the theories and practices of 
municipal fiscal management.  
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4.2 Pecking Order Theory and Governments’ Preference over Financial Resources 
4.2.1 Theories of Capital Structure: the Trade-Off Theory vs. the Pecking Order 
Theory 
The theories of organizational capital structure and financing decision-making can 
be synthesized into two dominant theories—the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory. The trade-off theory describes a family of related theories that assume that firms 
seek an optimal capital structure through a tradeoff between the tax advantages of issuing 
debt and the costs of financial distress when the debt burden is too high (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). The major benefits associated with debt issuance include the tax benefits 
on debt interest payments, and the mitigation of cash flow problems. The primary costs of 
debt include debt interest payments, fees associated with a bond issue (e.g. fees for 
underwriters, rating agencies, etc.), bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. A value-
maximizing firm seeks to maintain a capital structure that the marginal costs of debt 
equal its marginal benefit. This theory predicts that firms have target capital structure and 
they adjust gradually toward an optimal debt ratio.  
An alternative theory that explains organizational capital structure is the pecking 
order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the pecking order theory, there is 
no well-defined optimal debt ratio. Changes in debt ratios are driven by the need for 
external funds, not by any attempt to reach an optimal capital structure. The pecking 
order theory suggests that information asymmetry between owners/managers and 
investors creates a preference ranking over financial sources: internal funds first, 
followed by debt, and then equity. Firms follow this pecking order of financing in order 
to minimize adverse selection costs. Due to information asymmetry, owners and 
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managers of a firm know the true value of the firm’s assets and growth potential. 
Investors can only guess these values. In most cases, if a firm is overvalued by the 
market, the managers of the firm will be happy to sell equity whereas the managers of an 
undervalued firm will not. This suggests a potential adverse selection problem in the 
corporate stock market (Leary and Roberts 2004; Goyal and Frank 2008). If a firm offers 
to sell equity, investors may view it as a negative signal regarding the quality of the 
equity and the firms’ value (Baskin 1989). Therefore, firms prefer internal financial 
sources the most because using internal sources avoids the information asymmetry and 
underinvestment problems. When internal financial resources are insufficient to meet the 
financing need, firms first turn to risk-free debt, then risky debt, and finally equity. 
Firms’ pecking order behavior may also be explained by agency costs (Myers 2003). The 
agency theory argues that if managers search for external financial sources, they have to 
explain project details to outside investors and keep administration more transparent. This 
unavoidably exposes themselves to investor monitoring. Managers dislike this process 
and therefore they prefer using internal financial resources over external financing (Goyal 
and Frank 2008). 
4.2.2 The Modified Pecking Order Theory and Its Applications 
Neither the trade-off theory nor the pecking order theories could tell a full story of 
organizations’ capital structure and their financing decision-making (Leary and Roberts 
2010). Nevertheless, some researchers find that the pecking order is “a much better first-
cut explanation of the debt-equity choice” (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, 221). The 
pecking order is a good descriptor of firms’ financial behavior (Titman and Wessels 
1988; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Leary and Roberts 2004; Lemmon and Zender 
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2010). In Leary and Roberts’ recent study, they find that 77 percent of the firms in their 
sample follow the pecking order in choosing between internal and external finance (Leary 
and Roberts 2010). Some organizations such as nonprofit organizations do not have 
equity. Researchers describe a more liberal interpretation of the theory—the “modified 
(or dynamic) pecking order theory”—which relaxes the ordering of the hierarchy’s 
second rung, the choice between debt and equity, only examining the preference order of 
internal and external financial resources. The modified pecking order theory sometimes is 
used to explain nonprofit organizations’ capital structure and borrowing decisions. 
Scholars find evidence that nonprofit organizations also follow a pecking order of 
preference over financing sources: internal funds are preferred over external borrowing 
(Bowman 2002, Denison 2009, Yan, Denison, and Butler 2009, Calabrese 2011). 
Governments, similar to nonprofit organizations, do not have equity. It seems that 
the modified pecking order theory might be used to study governments’ financial 
management behaviors. However to my best knowledge, there is no study in public 
financial management that applies the modified pecking order theory to explain 
governments’ borrowing decision and their capital structure. This chapter of the 
dissertation presents the first known study that tests the application of the pecking order 
and modified pecking order theories from firms and nonprofit organizations to municipal 
governments, and examines whether municipal governments also have a pecking order 
preference when managing their cash flows. 
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4.2.3 The Internal and External Financial Resources of Municipal Governments 
In the management literature, the internal financial resources refer to cash, 
investment income, and other fungible resources a firm holds. External financial 
resources are those raised from external security issues (Myers and Majluf 1984; Baskin 
1989; Goyal and Frank 2008). In the government context, the internal financial resources 
refer to financial slack a government has accumulated, and the external financial 
resources are those raised from municipal security issues—government debt financing. 
As introduced in Chapter One, financial slack are accounting-based excess resources 
available to a government. It occurs when actual revenues exceed actual expenditures in a 
particular fiscal period, often caused by random errors in budget estimations and the 
conservative forecasting bias. In the previous two chapters, I examine factors that 
determine a municipal governments’ financial slack accumulation, and financial slack’s 
role in municipal expenditure stabilization, respectively. In this chapter, I examine how 
financial slack affects a city’s borrowing behavior by studying municipal governments’ 
preference over internal financial resources (i.e. financial slack) and external financial 
resources (i.e. debt financing).  
In the United States, subnational governments finance their current expenditures 
primarily by tax revenues such as property and sales taxes and non-tax revenues such as 
charges and fees. When a government cannot raise enough tax or non-tax revenues to 
cover its expenditures in a short time manner, it can increase liquidity through debt 
financing by issuing municipal securities. Municipal securities include “a bond, note, 
warrant, certificate of participation or other obligation issued by a state or local 
government or their agencies or authorities” according to the Municipal Securities 
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Rulemaking Board (MSRB).13 When municipal securities qualify for federal income tax 
exemption—interest or other investment earnings on them are excluded from gross 
income of the investors (bondholders)—the issuing government can borrow at much 
lower interest rates than taxable corporate securities. By the fourth quarter of 2015, the 
U.S. state and local governments have accumulated outstanding municipal securities of 
over $2.96 trillion, equal to 16.5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors 2016).  
The majority of municipal securities issued by subnational government are in the 
form of bonds. Bonds are characterized by their long-term maturity schedules. A typical 
long-term bond matures in more than 15 years from issuance.14 Bonds are generally used 
to finance capital investments. The reasons are capital assets are usually high-priced 
items, and financing such assets by pay-as-you-go (pay-go) approach requires large initial 
cash outlays which may cause a considerable tax rate increase or saving idle cash (slack) 
over several years. The pay-go financing approach may also impose an intergenerational 
inequity problem with current residents bearing its costs, while future residents enjoy the 
benefits. In addition, the pay-go method may cause the over-exhaustion of a tax base in 
the asset acquisition or construction period. Therefore, capital assets are usually financed 
through debt that matches the life range of the assets.  
Notes are distinguished from bonds by their short maturity length. Notes usually 
mature in one year or less, although sometimes notes with longer maturities are also 
                                                          
13 Source: “Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms” The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. Updated 
August 2013. Source: http://www.msrb.org/glossary.aspx (Accessed on April 4, 2016).  
14 Ibid.  
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issued.15 Notes are issued when the liquidity is low and repaid when available cash 
balances are expected to be strong. Governments issue notes primarily for cash 
management purposes—to offset the temporary cash deficit caused by the mismatched 
revenue schedule and expenditure schedule. Such notes are called cash flow management 
notes, including grant anticipation notes (GANs), tax anticipation notes (TANs), revenue 
anticipation notes (RANs), and tax and revenue anticipation notes (TRANs). 
Governments also issue short-term notes to provide interim financing for long-term 
capital investment projects (Trogen 2000; Fitch Ratings 2015). These notes are generally 
in the form of bond anticipation notes (BANs), construction loan notes (CLNs), or other 
forms of commercial papers (CPs). BANs are issued in anticipation of long-term bonds. 
CLNs are issued to fund construction of projects, and are repaid from bond proceeds or 
some pre-arranged commitment. CPs usually mature with 270 days, and they are often 
backed by a line of credit with a bank.16 In this study, I focus on the cash management 
notes only since the research interest of this chapter is to examine municipal 
governments’ preference over internal and external financial resources when managing 
their cash flows.    
4.3 A Model of Municipal Short-Term Borrowing 
I develop a model of municipal short-term borrowing which incorporates the 
amount of cash management notes issued by an individual municipal government in a 
particular fiscal year as a percentage of its total operating expenditures as the dependent 
variable (labeled as 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡), and unreserved general fund balance as a percentage of its 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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total operating expenditures as the independent variable (labeled as 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡). In the later 
regression analysis, 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is lagged by one year to measure a city’s beginning-of-year 
financial slack (labeled as 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1). The model also incorporates several control 
variables that are hypothesized to affect a city’s dependence on short-term borrowing, 
including a municipal government’s institutional, fiscal, demographic characteristics as 
well as some key features of the notes issued by government, and economic and market 
condition indicators. The general structure of the model is expressed: 
𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑓(𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1,   𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,  𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡,
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡,  𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡,  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚,𝑡,
 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡)                                              (13) 
A government’s fiscal policy space refers to the freedom government officials can 
operate, decide, and create fiscal policy; in other words, how many options or tools 
government officials can use to solve financial problems (Pagano and Hoene 2010). For 
municipal governments, their fiscal policy space is usually determined by state 
governments’ restrictions on local fiscal policies (Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Most of 
these constraints take the form of tax and expenditure limitations. In California, the 
passage of its Proposition 13 in 1978 changed local governments’ fiscal policy space as it 
shifted the control of property taxes (property value assessment and property tax revenue 
allocation) from local governments to the state (Shires 1999; Hoene 2004). Under 
Proposition 13, the assessed property value was rolled back and frozen at the 1976 
assessed level. Increases in property value assessment should be no more than 2 percent 
per year as long as the property is not sold; once sold, the property is reassessed at 
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1percent of the sale price, and the 2 percent yearly increase cap becomes applicable to 
future years. Any new special tax from local governments must be passed by a two-thirds 
vote of the electorate (Hoene 2004). These limitations however, may not apply to 
municipalities that have adopted a city charter. The California State Constitution allows 
cities to adopt city charters, and local governments can gain more fiscal policy space 
once they obtain the charter. Compared to the general law cities, charter cities have 
broader assessment power and taxation powers (for example, imposing real property 
transfer tax). They have supreme authorities over local expenditures, land use and zoning 
decisions, and municipal contracts. They also have the freedom to choose form of 
government, methods of elections, voting requirements, personnel matters, and among 
others.17 As of July 1, 2011, among the 482 incorporated cities in California, 121 cities 
are charter cities, and the rest are general law cities.18 To examine how fiscal policy space 
factor influences municipal short-term borrowing, I include 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 in the model. 
This variable is coded 1 if a municipal government is a charter city in a particular fiscal 
year; 0 if it is a general law city. 
  A government’s fiscal structure denotes its key financial characteristics, such as 
revenue sources, tax burden, debt structure, levels of fund balance, and so forth 
(Hendrick and Crawford 2014). Proposition 13 has changed Californian municipal 
governments’ fiscal structures. Cities in California shifted their dependence on property 
tax revenue to a diversity of revenue sources, particularly to charges and miscellaneous 
                                                          
17 Source: “General Law City v. Charter City” League of California Cities. 
http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/Chart_General_Law_v-
_Charter_Cities-07-26-11 (Accessed on April 4, 2016).  
18 “Charter City List” League of California Cities. http://www.cacities.org/Resources/Charter-Cities 
(Accessed on April 4, 2016).  
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revenues. Researchers find that between 1978 and 1995, total charges and miscellaneous 
revenues of California cities grew by nearly 400 percent (Shires 1999). There is little 
change in expenditure structure. However, one notable change in expenditure shares is 
the interest paid on outstanding debt, which increased from 3 percent to 8 percent 
between 1972 and 2002 (Hoene 2004). Changes in revenue structures inevitably 
influence how municipal governments manage their financial resources. To capture the 
impact of fiscal structure on municipal governments’ short-term borrowing, I include five 
fiscal structure factors in the model as described below. 
The first measure is dependence on intergovernmental revenue. Financial 
professionals and researchers have recognized that over dependence on 
intergovernmental revenues is a risk factor in municipal finance because the amount of 
aid from the state and federal government and the time of aid disbursement are not under 
the control of municipal government (Bowman, Calia, and Metzgar 1999; Hendrick 
2006). To make things worse, state governments often reduce the amount of aid or delay 
the disbursement during economic recessions when municipal governments are in greater 
need of such revenue (Hoene 2009). Dependence on intergovernmental revenues adds 
uncertainty to municipal revenue estimation and sometimes creates cash flow problems in 
municipal financial management. This suggests that municipal governments with greater 
dependence on intergovernmental revenues may need more internal and/or external 
financial resources to manage their cash flows. I use revenues received from state and 
county governments as a percentage of total municipal revenues to measure this variable, 
and label it 𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡.  
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The second measure is revenue diversification calculated by a reversed 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on five primary own-source general revenues: 
property taxes (include secured and unsecured property taxes, and supplemental property 
taxes), sales and transient lodging taxes, franchises and business license taxes, real 
property transfer taxes, and other taxes (include utility users tax, construction 
development taxes, and admission taxes). Calculation of revenue diversification is shown 
below. The value of this index ranges from 0 to 1 with increasing values indicating 
greater revenue diversification. Effective revenue diversification is considered to reduce 
revenue volatility (Carroll 2009). Municipal governments with stable revenue streams 
may need less short-term debt to balance their cash flows.   
𝑅𝐷 =  
1−∑ 𝑅𝑗
25
𝑗=1
1− 
1
5
                                                                        (14) 
Non-discretionary spending categories such as salary expenditures and debt 
service expenditures restrict a municipal government’s spending flexibility and may 
increase demands in short-term borrowing to manage cash flows. I include 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
measured as salary expenditures as a percentage of total municipal operating 
expenditures, and 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 measured as expenditures on debt principal retirement, 
interests, and other financial charges as a percentage of total municipal operating 
expenditures in the model. The last fiscal structural factor is 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 measured as 
per capital long-term debt outstanding. Debt burden influences municipal short-term 
borrowing in two ways: on one hand, higher current debt burden may reduce a 
government’s future debt issuance capacity; on the other hand, more long-term debt 
outstanding is associated with higher interest payments on debt, indicating that a 
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municipal government may have higher demand in issuing notes to manage its cash 
flows. How debt burden affects a city’s short-term borrowing will be tested in the 
empirical analysis.    
The size of a city may affect its access to the municipal securities market, as 
smaller cities sometimes face more restrictions on debt issuance. City size is also 
associated with the independent variable—𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡. Findings in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation and previous studies suggest that smaller cities generally accumulate more 
financial slack (Hendrick 2006; Marlowe 2012). I include the natural logarithm of 
population to control the impact of city size.  
Municipal financial activities are open to the general economy. Therefore, the 
local economic condition and the municipal securities market condition directly shape 
municipal finance and financial management. Municipal revenues tend to move with the 
ebb and flow of local economic activities. When local economy booms, municipal 
revenues increase due to the strong tax base; while local economy is in recession, 
municipal governments receive fewer revenues due to shrinking tax base and are more 
likely to suffer financial stress. I use the unemployment rate of the county where the city 
locates to control for the general economic condition.  
The municipal securities market condition is also taken into account in the 
model—lower yields indicate lower borrowing cost for municipal governments and this 
may give some incentive for municipal governments to take advantage of securities 
market. The Bond Buyer publishes indices on a weekly basis for general obligation 
bonds, revenue bonds, and notes. These indices reflect the average estimated yields of the 
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bonds or notes. I use the Bond Buyer’s One-Year Note Index to measure the overall 
municipal securities market condition. 
The model also includes note interest rate charged on a particular transaction to 
capture the cost of short-term borrowing. I hypothesize that if a city can borrow at lower 
interest rates, it might issue more notes to take advantage of the low borrowing costs.  
4.4 Data Sources, Sample Description, and Methodology 
4.4.1 Data Sources and Sample Creation 
This model is tested using a sample of cities in California. I choose California 
cities to study this subject for three reasons. First, California is among those states where 
local governments actively issue notes for cash management purpose. Second, California 
is among the very few states that release its local governments’ short-term debt issuance 
information. Third, California has the largest population and economy in the United 
States, making this study significant even though it is not a nationwide study. In addition, 
the California Constitution gives its cities the authority to become charter cities. Charter 
cities have much more local controls than the general law cities, and they have supreme 
authority over municipal affairs.19 This provides an opportunity to examine how 
institutional factors affect municipal governments’ financial management options. 
I compile information from various sources. The two primary data sources are the 
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC)’s Debt Issuance 
Database and the California State Controller’s website. California state law requires that 
                                                          
19 Source: “Charter Cities: A Quick Summary for the Press and Researchers” League of California Cities. 
http://www.cacities.org/Resources/Charter-Cities (Accessed on April 4, 2016). 
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all governmental agencies which issue debt should report information on each issuance to 
the CDIAC.20 In 2006, the CDIAC launched a publicly accessible database that includes 
comprehensive information on bonds, notes, and other public debt sold or issued by the 
State and all of its local governmental agencies. The information includes issue dates, 
issuer, type of bond issuance, and financial characteristics associated with each bond sale 
such as interest costs, sale type, sources of payment, and others. Data is available from 
1984 to the present, and is updated monthly. This database is especially valuable for the 
study of short-term borrowing. Some alternative data sources may provide information on 
government notes issuance. For example, the Census Bureau’s Local Government 
Finance database reports the year-end note outstanding. However, because most of the 
notes are paid off within 12 months, the year-end note outstanding does not tell much 
about the amount of notes that have been issued during the year, but rather the amount of 
outstanding notes that are carried to the next fiscal year. The note issuance information 
reported in the CDIAC’s database provides a much accurate measure of the amount of 
short-term debt issued by a municipal government in a particular fiscal year. 
The CDIAC’s Debt Issuance Database does not report municipal revenues, 
expenditures, assets, liabilities, fund balances, and other financial information. I obtain 
such information from the California State Controller’s open data website. Cities in 
California are required by law to report their financial data in paper format to the 
Controller within 90 days after the close of the fiscal year, or in the required electronic 
format within 110 days. The Controller’s office reviews, compiles, and publishes the 
                                                          
20 Source: “Government Code 8855(k) and 8855(i)” State of California Lenitive Counsel. 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=08001-09000&file=8855-8859 
(Accessed April 4, 2016).  
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annual financial transaction reports. I obtain the list of California charter cities from the 
League of California Cities’ website, each city’s population information from the 
California Department of Finance’s website, the county level unemployment rates from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website, and the one-year note index from the Bond 
Buyer’s website. 
4.4.2 Sample Selection and Selection Bias 
 I draw a sample of 478 California cities that include key information captured by 
the various sources mentioned above. Four cities are left out, either because they were 
incorporated after 2010, or there is obvious data error or missing data.21 Due the change 
in definition of unreserved general fund balance (UFB) required by GASB Statement No. 
54, I restrict the time span of the sample between fiscal years 2003 and 2011 to avoid 
potential measurement inconsistency on fund balance. Regarding the issuance of short-
term debts, I restrict the sample to include cash management notes only, excluding all 
other types of notes such as projects notes, notes for single or multiple family housing, 
equipment, utility, and among other purposes. Among the 478 cities in California, 420 
cities (or 88%) have never issued any cash management notes from fiscal years 2003 
through 2011. Fifty-eight cities issued 209 cash management notes during the study 
period. Seventeen of them issued cash management notes only once, and five cities have 
issued cash management notes every year during the nine years.22 Table 7 presents a 
                                                          
21 These four cities are: City of Jurupa Valley (incorporated on July 1, 2011), City of Eastvale (incorporated 
on October 1, 2010), City of Escalon (multiple years of negative general fund operating expenditures), and 
City of Paso Robles (key financial information is missing).  
22 These five cities are: City of Berkeley, City of Los Angeles, City of Oakland, City of San Diego, and 
City of Selma.  
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detailed distribution of cash management notes issued by California cities between fiscal 
years 2003 and 2011.  
 
Table 7. Cash Flow Notes Issuances Distribution, FY2003-FY2011 
Number of Note 
Issuances 
Number 
of Cities 
Column 1 × 
Column 2 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 17 17 8.1 8.1 
2 12 24 11.5 19.6 
3 5 15 7.2 26.8 
4 5 20 9.6 36.4 
5 5 25 12.0 48.4 
6 3 18 8.6 57.0 
7 3 21 10.0 67.0 
8 3 24 11.5 78.5 
9 5 45 21.5 100.0 
Total 58 209  100.0 
 
The fact that a large number of cities never issue cash management notes raises a 
concern of potential selection bias in the sample. Sample selection bias arises when a 
researcher does not observe a random sample of a population of interest. In other words, 
observations on the dependent variable are not missing randomly, but conditional on 
some variables. One such example is the effect of education on women’s wages where 
the dependent variable can only be observed when an individual female participates in 
the labor market. Without any correction, samples with selection bias often lead to 
inconsistent estimators and biased inferences (Heckman 1979). Similar in this study of 
municipal short-term borrowing, observations on the dependent variable (i.e. Note) can 
only be observed if a city has issued cash management notes. The issuance of cash 
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management notes by these cities is not random, but rather depends on several factors. 
For example, in California, charter cities often enjoy more fiscal policy space than the 
general law cities. Due to the more fiscal tools they have, they may not need to 
accumulate as much financial slack to manage cash flows as the general law cities do. 
This will affect their need in short-term debt financing. It is also reasonable to 
hypothesize that cities that face greater fiscal stress are more likely to issue cash 
management notes. To compare whether cities that issue cash management notes 
significantly differ from those which do not, I conduct a two-sample t-test to compare 
cities that have issued cash management notes and those that have not over some key 
municipal characteristics variables. Results in Table 8 show that charter cities, cities with 
more population, less financial slack, more diversified revenue sources, greater shares of 
salary expenditures and debt service expenditures are more likely to issue cash 
management notes. This suggest that selection bias exists in this sample.  
 
Table 8. Two-Sample T-Test of Cash Flow Notes Issuance 
Variable Mean Difference t-Statistics 
Cities without 
Note Issuance 
Cities with 
Note Issuance 
  
Charter City 0.24 0.49 -0.25 -8.15 
Population 48,89 337,84 -288,95 -21.68 
Financial Slack 41.19 9.52 31.67 8.81 
Intergovernmental Revenue 6.27 5.35 0.92 1.51 
Revenue Diversification 0.74 0.79 -0.05 -5.33 
Salary  32.54 39.88 -7.34 -8.86 
Debt Interest 2.47 4.12 -1.65 -7.60 
Debt Burden 846.33 80.48 756.86 0.26 
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4.4.3 Heckman Selection Model  
Researchers use models to take account of sample selection bias. Among those 
widely used models in social science literature is the Heckman selection model. The 
Heckman selection model is a type of Tobit model that treats selection bias as an omitted 
variable bias. The first stage of this model is to create a selection equation and estimate 
the probability that a city would issue cash management notes. Then a statistically 
adjusted value (inverse mills ratio) is calculated for each observation based on the 
expected error from the selection equation. In the second stage, the model that examines 
whether financial slack reduces the amount of cash management notes issuances includes 
inverse mills ratio as an explanatory variable. The results—the Heckman estimators—are 
thus adjusted from self-selection bias (details see Heckman 1979).   
Variables used in the first stage selection model are: 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 
𝐼𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡, and 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡. These 
variables are expected to affect a city’s probability to issue cash management notes. The 
second stage estimation model includes all variables used in the first stage except 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 because a city (or town) charter may influence a city’s access to the 
municipal securities market, and hence its probability to issue notes; but it does not 
necessarily determine how much notes a city issues. The amount of notes issuance is 
more likely dependent upon a city’s fiscal stress over cash flows. The second stage model 
also includes one variable that is not included in the selection equation—interest rate at 
notes issuance (𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖). The note interest rates reported in the CDIAC database 
are either calculated based on net interest cost (NIC) or true interest cost (TIC). TIC and 
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NIC are similar, except that TIC takes into account the time value of money. The longer 
it takes for a bond to mature and the more interest payment periods are involved, the 
greater difference between NIC interest rate and TIC interest rate. In recent years, TIC 
interest rates are gaining more popularity among researchers as a proper measure of bond 
costs (Hildreth and Zorn 2005). Unfortunately, the note information in the CDIAC 
database is not sufficient to convert all interest rates into a uniform one. However, this is 
less of an issue for notes than for long-term bonds. Most notes mature within a year, and 
interest is payable at maturity without redemption prior to maturity. The short maturity 
length and single interest payment period indicate that conceptually, the difference 
between NIC interest rate and TIC interest should be negligible. A few cities reported 
both NIC and TIC interest rates in the CDIAC database in Fiscal Year 2012. These cases 
confirm my assumption that the differences between the two interest rates are subtle. The 
next section presents descriptive statistics on municipal financial slack and note issuance 
by California cities and the Heckman estimators of municipal short-term borrowing. 
4.5 Findings 
4.5.1 An Overview of Financial Slack Accumulation and Notes Issuance by 
California Cities 
In organizational theory, slack is considered a crucial buffer which protects 
organizations from uncertainty and risks (Levinthal and March 1981; Moe 1984). 
Further, the pecking order theory believes that financial slack (internal fund) is preferred 
by financial managers compared to debt and equity (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 
1984). From an organizational perspective, accumulating financial slack is a good 
management strategy. A commonly cited standard suggests that governments should 
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maintain rainy day funds approximately five percent of the general fund expenditures 
(Joyce 2001). The GFOA recommends that the “five-percent rule” should only be an 
appropriate benchmark for very large cities, and the majority of cities should maintain 
unrestricted general fund balance no less than fifteen percent of regular general fund 
operating revenues or expenditures (Gauthier 2009). Figure 10 demonstrates the trend of 
average financial slack accumulation by California cities between fiscal years 2003 and 
2011. The trend of slack accumulation shows a clear pro-cyclical pattern: during 
economic expansions (FY2003 – FY2007), cities increased their financial slack levels, 
and the accumulated slack peaked when the economy reached the summit in FY2007. 
Slack declined significantly in the Great Recession of 2007-2009. When the economy 
recovered from recession, slack accumulation recovered accordingly. During the nine 
years, California cities accumulate UFB about 39.6 percent of total operating 
expenditures (or 4.7 months of total general fund operating expenditures). The pro-
cyclical slack accumulation pattern of California cities is comparable with the national 
slack accumulation trend (see Figure 2 in Chapter Two). However, California cities’ 
financial slack level is way beyond the GFOA’s recommended 15 percent benchmark (or 
5 percent for the very large cities). In Chapter Two of the dissertation, based on a 
nationwide sample of cities, I find that on average, American cities accumulated UFB 
about 20 percent of operating expenditures between fiscal years 2003 and 2011. 
California’s cities accumulated almost twice as much financial slack during the same 
period.   
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Source: “California Local Government Revenues and Spending” reported on the California Local 
Government Finance Almanac website (http://www.californiacityfinance.com/) (author’s calculation) 
Figure 10. Average (Mean) Financial Slack Accumulation by California Cities (%UFB) 
 
There are some possible explanations of California cities’ above the national 
average financial slack accumulation. Findings in Chapter Two and several previous 
studies show that smaller cities accumulate more financial slack. It is possible that the 
California sample includes a larger proportion of smaller cities. To investigate this 
possibility, I compare the population distributions of the two samples. Table 9 shows that 
in general, cities in the California sample are smaller than cities in the nationwide sample. 
However, the city size difference in the two sample is marginal and the two samples have 
pretty comparable population distributions. This indicates that the difference in city sizes 
in the two samples is not the primary explanation of California cities’ above national 
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average financial slack level. Another possible explanation is California’s Proposition 13 
which restricts the state and local governments’ revenue raising capacity. Cities that are 
affected by Proposition 13 cannot take advantage of the rising property values because 
the growth rate of assessed property values is capped. Government officials cannot adjust 
tax revenues by changing the millage rates without voters’ approval. The restriction in 
revenue raising capacity and the loss in revenue adjustment flexibility probably motivate 
these cities’ government officials to accumulate more financial slack in order to increase 
their management discretion.  
 
Table 9. Population Distributions of the Two Samples 
  California Sample Nationwide Sample 
Mean 63,104 69,954 
1st Quartile 99 ~ 10,756 33 ~ 14,000 
2nd Quartile 10,761 ~ 28,281 14,002 ~ 28,522 
3rd Quartile 28,301 ~ 64,635 28,531 ~ 60,649 
4th Quartile 64,679 ~ 3.8 million 60,652 ~ 8.4 million 
  
 Regarding notes issuance, during this nine-year period, 58 cities have issued 209 
notes for cash management purpose. Nine cities issued notes more than once within a 
fiscal year. For data analysis purpose, I consider the multiple note issuances within a 
fiscal year as only one, taking the sum of multiple principals as the total principal, and the 
weighted average interest rate as the interest rate, and the weighted average maturity 
length as the maturity length. Figure 11 presents the average cash management notes 
issued by California cities between 2003 and 2011. The trend of note issuances 
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demonstrates a relatively constant upward slope, with a peak of notes issuance in fiscal 
year 2009, when the U.S. economy was in the midst of the Great Recession.  
 
 
Source: Debt issuance data reported on the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission website 
(author’s calculation) 
Figure 11. Average (Mean) Cash Management Notes Issuance by California Cities 
(Millions $) 
 
The majority of these notes are issued in the form of tax and revenue anticipation 
notes (TRANs). Most of these notes are paid by general fund revenues. Negotiated sale is 
the dominant way of notes sales, and most cities choose net interest costs (NIC) to 
measure the costs. Among cities that issued cash flow notes, the mean average amount of 
principals issued by an individual city in a fiscal year is $58.5 million, with the smallest 
principal amount of $250,000 and the largest principal amount of $1.26 billion. The mean 
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average interest rate for these notes is 2.29%. On average, these notes matured in 366 
days, with the shortest maturity length of 49 days, and longest mature length of 411 days. 
Table 10 presents the detailed descriptive statistics of cash management notes issued by 
California cities during the study period.    
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of Note Issuance by California Cities (FY2003~FY2011) 
  Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Principal Amount (million $) 6.36 58.5 182 0.25 1,260 
Interest Rate (%) 1.95 2.29 1.37 0.08 9.00 
Maturity Length (days)  379 366 50 49 411 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Forms of Notes      
Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes (TRANs) 206 98.56 98.56 
Tax Anticipation Notes (TANs) 2 0.96 99.52 
Revenue Anticipation Notes (RANs) 1 0.48 100 
Repayment Sources    
General Fund Revenues 205 98.09 98.09 
Property Tax Revenues 3 1.44 99.53 
Intergovernmental Transfers 1 0.48 100.00 
Sales Types    
Competitive Sales 48 22.97 22.97 
Negotiated Sales 161 77.03 100.00 
Interest Types    
Net Interest Costs (NIC) 135 64.59 64.59 
True Interest Costs (TIC) 69 33.01 97.61 
Variable Interest Rates 5 2.39 100.00 
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4.5.2 Does Financial Slack Reduce Municipal Short-Term Borrowing? 
The modified pecking order theory predicts that managers prefer internal funds to 
external funds, and hence financial slack might reduce a city’s need of short-term 
borrowing. I use a Heckman selection model to examine the impact of beginning-of-year 
financial slack on municipal cash flow note issuance. All coefficients are robust 
estimators obtained by using the cluster option that specifies to which group (i.e. city) 
each observation belongs to. This cluster option relaxes the usual requirement of 
independent observations—observations are independent across groups (clusters) but not 
necessary within groups. Table 11 reports the Heckman estimators and the associated 
robust standard errors and z statistics.  
 The coefficients on beginning-of-year financial slack are negatively significant at 
both stages, suggesting that financial slack not only lowers a city’s probability to issue 
cash management notes, but also reduces the principal amount of the notes issued in a 
fiscal year. The second stage coefficient on beginning-of-year financial slack shows that 
when UFB as percentage of total operating expenditures increases by 10 percentage 
points, the principal amount of notes as percentage of total general fund revenue 
decreases by 1.88 percentage points. Considering the mean average general fund of $41 
million (or median average general fund revenue of $14.5 million) among California 
cities, the 1.88 percentage points drop in cash management notes equals about $770,800 
decrease (or $261,000 decrease) in total principal amount of notes.   
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Table 11. Heckman Estimators on Notes Issuance 
  Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Z Statistics 
Second Stage 
Financial Slack (beginning of year) -0.188** 0.083 -2.25 
Intergovernmental Revenue -0.020 0.112 -0.18 
Revenue Diversification -0.853 9.416 -0.09 
Debt Burden -0.003 0.003 -1.05 
Debt Interest Expenses 0.587** 0.250 2.35 
Salary Burden 0.360*** 0.113 3.20 
Note Interest Rate -0.244 0.676 -0.36 
Log of Population 0.752 1.141 0.66 
Unemployment Rate 0.214 0.516 0.41 
Note Index 1.426 1.130 1.26 
First Stage (Selection Model) 
Financial Slack (beginning of year) -0.022*** 0.004 -5.17 
Charter City 0.134 0.104 1.29 
Intergovernmental Revenue -0.001 0.009 -0.08 
Revenue Diversification -0.837 0.600 -1.39 
Debt Burden -0.000 0.000 -0.12 
Debt Interest Expenses 0.031 0.020 1.58 
Salary Burden 0.022*** 0.007 3.23 
Log of Population 0.248*** 0.075 3.30 
Unemployment Rate -0.016 0.031 -0.51 
Note Index 0.047 0.066 0.71 
Number of Obs. 3,756   
Censored Obs. 3,574   
Uncensored Obs. 182   
Rho 0.964   
Sigma 11.476   
Lambda 11.062   
Wald Chi2(10) 38.61***     
Note: significance levels are indicated as * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
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 The statistically significant coefficients on salary expenditures at both stages and 
the significant coefficient on debt interest expenditures at the second stage suggest that a 
city’s salary payment burden and debt interest payment burden exert obvious positive 
influence on whether a city borrows short-term debt and how much it borrows. On 
average, when a city’s salaries and wages paid to city employees as percentage of total 
operating expenditures increases by 10 percentage points, the principal amount of notes 
as percentage of total revenue rises by 3.6 percentage points. When a city’s debt interest 
payment as percentage of total general fund operating expenditures increases by 10 
percentage points, the principal amount of notes as percentage of total revenue rises by 
5.9 percentage points. These findings provide evidence to support organization theorists’ 
argument that greater share of non-discretionary expenditure categories restrict a city’s 
financial management flexibility and thus increases its dependence on short-term 
borrowing.  
The coefficient on the natural logarithm of population is positively significant 
only at the first stage, suggesting that larger cities are more likely to issue cash 
management notes, but the size of a city does not necessarily influence how much cash 
management notes it needs to issue. The coefficients on charter cities are not significant 
at either stage of Heckman estimation procedure. This suggests that issuing cash 
management notes is not a financial management choice specifically associated with 
charter cities. There is no obvious difference between charter cities and the general cities 
regarding using short-term borrowing to manage their cash flows.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
 This paper examines factors that affect municipal governments’ short-term 
borrowing, regarding the probability and amount of cash management notes issuance. 
The finding that financial slack reduces a city’s probability to issue notes and the 
principal amount of note issuance supports the modified pecking order theory’s claim: 
when both internal financial resources (financial slack) and external financial resources 
(short-term borrowing) are available, government financial officers prefer internal 
financing to external financing. This study extends the application of pecking order 
theory from firms and nonprofit organizations to local governments. The conclusion that 
government financial officers also have a pecking order preference over public financial 
resources further indicates that the modified pecking order theory can be used to analyze 
government financial officers’ decision making in public finance and financial 
management in future research.  
The paper also finds that holding financial slack constant, non-discretionary 
spending categories such as debt interest burden and salary burden increase a city’s 
dependence on short-term borrowing. This is because non-discretionary spending 
categories restrict financial managers’ flexibility in managing financial resources. When 
confronted with financial challenges such as revenue shortfalls, municipal financial 
managers with fewer available resources on hand have to rely on short-term borrowing. 
This evidence supports Cyert and March (1963) and other organization theorists’ claim 
that organizations exposed to more risk factors need more financial slack to hedge against 
potential risks and uncertainties. Results from this study thus explain why municipal 
governments accumulate financial slack, and to some extent, provide justification of 
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municipal financial slack accumulation as a financial management strategy. Revenue 
factors (i.e. intergovernmental revenue ratio and revenue diversification) do not appear to 
exert any significant influence on municipal short-term borrowing in this study. 
In all, this study finds evidence to support both the modified pecking order 
theory’s claim on managers’ preference over financial resources and organization 
theory’s slack-risk relationship. It improves our understanding of the roles of financial 
slack in local government finance. Financial slack plays more than a countercyclical 
expenditure stabilization role as discussed in Chapter Three of this dissertation and in a 
few other studies (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015). It may also improve local governments’ 
credit worthiness (Marlowe 2011). This study adds one more role of financial slack in 
local government financial management: it serves as a convenient cash management tool 
and reduces municipal governments’ reliance on short-term borrowing. Yet there is still a 
tremendous gap in our understanding of local government slack accumulation, regarding 
the rationales, the optimal level, and the impacts. This analysis was limited to a single 
state. If data is available, future studies should examine local governments across states 
and take account of fiscal, political, managerial, organizational, and economic factors. 
Another limitation of this study is that it primarily examines the impacts of a city’s fiscal 
structural factors on municipal government officials’ preference over internal and 
external financial resources, without paying much attention to those political factors such 
as forms of government, political conservatism, and party affiliation. The fiscal policy 
space variable—charter city—captures some of the variations that political factors 
explain because charter cities have greater political authorities such as the freedom to 
choose forms of government, methods of election, voting requirements, and among 
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others. Nevertheless, this dummy variable cannot capture the nuance of impacts of 
particular political factors on municipal financial decision making. Future research 
should overcome this limitation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of the Dissertation 
 In this dissertation, I explore the role of financial slack in municipal finance. The 
subject of study is of significant importance and policy relevance because municipal 
governments are the layer of governments that are closest to citizens. In the past decade, 
American cities have experienced an economic peak in 2007, an economic recession 
between late 2007 and 2009, and economic recovery from 2010. During this turbulent 
economic time, how cities managed their finances directly shape the outcomes of public 
goods and service provision that matters to people’s daily life. In the management 
literature, organization theorists posit that financial slack increases an organization’s 
capacity in absorbing internal and external shocks. It offers managers more discretion to 
respond to uncertainty. In the turbulent economic time when government officials face 
more uncertainty in managing their cities’ revenues and expenditures, what roles does 
financial slack play in municipal financial management?  
Prior studies on how financial slack affects government management primarily 
focus on financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role in state governments. Findings 
from these studies have reached a relatively consistent conclusion that financial slack has 
a counter-cyclical stabilization effect on state expenditures. Studies on financial slack’s 
role in local governments are much scarce. The majority of these studies also focus on 
financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role, but findings from these studies are mixed. 
Some find that financial slack stabilizes local expenditures (Marlowe 2005; Wang 2015), 
others do not find such effect (Hendrick 2006; Wang and Hou 2012). Almost all these 
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studies at the local level use samples of cities (or counties) in one state or a particular 
metropolitan area. Results from these studies have relatively low external validity. This 
dissertation addresses the limitations in the current research on financial slack in 
municipal finance.  
 The revenue chapter investigates whether tax revenue volatility contributes to 
municipal financial slack accumulation. Based on a nationwide sample of cities, I use a 
dynamic panel analysis approach to conduct the empirical analysis. I find that tax revenue 
volatility as a risk factor increases a city’s financial slack level. In addition to this, other 
risk factors in a city’s fiscal system such as non-discretionary expenditure categories also 
contribute to municipal financial slack accumulation. These findings provide evidence to 
support organization theory’s risk-slack hypothesis. This chapter also provides important 
descriptive information that improves our current understanding of financial slack 
accumulation by American cities. It presents the national average municipal financial 
slack level, the pro-cyclical trend of slack accumulation over the course of the business 
cycles, and the regional differences in financial slack accumulation. The information 
presents an overall picture of financial slack accumulation by American cities, providing 
a basis for further assessment of financial slack’s roles in municipal finance.    
 The expenditure chapter examines whether financial slack stabilizes municipal 
expenditures. Different from prior studies that focus on beginning-of-year financial 
slack’s expenditure stabilization role in economic booms and busts, I examine this 
question by looking at how the year-to-year change in financial slack affects the year-to-
year change in municipal expenditures. Results suggest that financial slack absorbs 
additional revenues when there is a revenue surplus and it release financial resources 
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when there is a revenue shortfall. Changes in financial slack always counteract changes in 
expenditures, thus financial slack smooths expenditure fluctuations. This study shifts the 
research attention on financial slack from the macro perspective to a relatively micro 
perspective. It dissects the mechanism of financial slack’s expenditure stabilization role 
in municipal finance. Results from this study complement prior studies on financial 
slack’s counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization.  
 The municipal securities chapter explores whether financial slack reduces 
municipal short-term borrowing. Based on a sample of California cities, I use a Heckman 
selection model to examine municipal governments’ preference over internal financial 
resources (i.e. financial slack) and external financial resources (i.e. short-term 
borrowing). Results show that financial slack reduces both the probability municipal 
governments issue notes and the amount of notes issuance, suggesting that municipal 
governments prefer internal financial resources to external financial resources. This 
finding provides evidence to support the modified pecking order theory that governments, 
like firms and nonprofit organizations, also have a preference ranking over internal and 
external financial resources. This chapter is the first-known study that tests the 
application of the modified pecking order theory from firms and nonprofit organizations 
to local governments.    
In summary, this dissertation is a comprehensive examination of municipal 
financial slack, exploring both the determinants of financial slack accumulation and the 
impacts of financial slack on municipal financial management. It covers three primary 
subfields in municipal finance, namely, municipal revenues, municipal expenditures, and 
municipal securities. Results from this dissertation complement prior studies on 
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government financial slack, provide evidence to support some known theories, and 
extend the application of theories in the government context. The next section discusses 
the innovations and contributions of this dissertation.   
5.2 Innovations and Contributions 
5.2.1 Innovations 
This dissertation is built on theories in a variety of fields. I draw theories from the 
management literature, corporate and nonprofit finance, economics, and public finance, 
and apply them to municipal governments. At the initial dissertation design stage, I 
interviewed practitioners and researchers with experience in local government finance. 
These interviews and discussions provide a foundation to assess financial slack’s roles in 
municipal finance. Based on theories and practitioners’ perspectives, this dissertation 
goes beyond the conventional research focus—financial slack’s expenditure stabilization 
role. This dissertation explores both the determinants of municipal financial slack 
accumulation and the impacts of financial slack on municipal financial performance and 
decision-making.  
 I obtain information from a variety of sources, including the accounting 
information from CAFRs, the revenue, expenditure, and debt information from the 
Census Bureau, and the social economic information from various government agencies 
and research institutes’ websites. I combine the information of various sources and create 
a nationwide sample of cities. The nationwide sample of cities provides a venue to 
observe the overall picture of financial slack accumulation by American cities. It also 
significantly improves the external validity of the findings compared to prior studies.  
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 In each chapter, I carefully choose an appropriate research design and analytical 
strategy based on the research question and the features of data structures. For example, 
in the revenue chapter, I use a dynamic panel data analysis approach to address the 
persistency of the dependent variable; in the expenditure chapter, I use the first-
differenced equation model to examine how changes in the independent variable affect 
the changes in the dependent variable; and in the municipal securities chapter, I use a 
Heckman selection model to overcome the selection bias problem. The choice of 
appropriate analytical strategies together with rigorous statistical checks guarantees the 
robustness and reliability of results.  
I attempt to approach the research questions from new perspectives rather than 
simply follow other scholars’ research designs in prior studies. For example, in the 
expenditure chapter, I shift the research focus from financial slack’s expenditure 
stabilization effects in the business cycles to its stabilization effects on the year-to-year 
expenditure adjustments. I also attempt to apply theories and hypotheses in other fields to 
the context of municipal governments. For example, in the securities chapter, I apply the 
modified pecking order theory which is often used in the studies of firms and nonprofit 
organizations’ capital structures to the analysis of municipal governments’ preference on 
internal and external financial resources. These attempts lead to research findings that 
provide new perspectives to our understanding of financial slack’s roles in municipal 
finance.  
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5.2.2 Contributions 
Theoretical Contributions 
 This dissertation improves our current understanding of financial slack beyond the 
‘five percent’ rule of thumb and the GFOA’s recommended best practice. It provides 
empirical evidence that a municipal government that faces more risk factors tend to 
accumulate more financial slack. Although this dissertation does not find a formula to 
assess the ‘appropriate’ financial slack level for individual cities, I believe these findings 
provide some insight for future studies that dedicate to this research goal. Results from 
this dissertation support Cyert and March (1963) and other organization theorists’ risk-
slack hypothesis: financial slack improves an organization’s capacity in respond to risks 
and uncertainties, thus an organization that faces more risk factors accumulate more 
financial slack. This finding suggests that municipal government officials accumulate 
financial slack to prepare for future uncertainties. It improves our understanding of 
government saving beyond public choice scholars’ assumption that governments are 
slack-maximizing bureaucracies. Government financial slack accumulation is driven by 
government officials’ intention to increase management capacity against future risks and 
uncertainties. This finding helps us to better understand government financial resources 
allocation between spending and saving.  
 This dissertation also improves our understanding of the roles of financial slack in 
local government finance. Financial slack is not just a convenient tool to management 
expenditure fluctuations, it also affects government credit ratings (Marlowe 2011), cash 
flow management, and short-term borrowing. Financial slack may have other roles in 
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local government finance awaiting researchers to explore. This dissertation pushes 
towards that research direction.  
Policy Implications      
 Besides the theoretical contributions, this dissertation carries valuable policy 
implications in threefold. For municipal government officials, this dissertation provides 
information of the national and regional average municipal financial slack levels which 
help them to compare their cities financial slack levels with their peers. The findings that 
risk factors affect municipal financial slack accumulation further help local officials to 
assess the appropriateness of their cities’ financial slack level and decide their cities’ 
needs in financial slack accumulation. The findings that financial slack stabilizes 
municipal expenditures and reduces municipal short-term borrowing inform municipal 
government officials that financial slack is a convenient tool to manage expenditure 
volatility and cash flows if not considering the intergenerational equity issue of the 
taxpayers.  
 For state policy makers, this dissertation delivers a message that when making 
policies to guide local fiscal practices, state policy makers should realize the importance 
of financial slack in municipal finance. Most state governments use financial slack to 
stabilize budgets and expenditures. Almost all state governments have established a 
formal fund for this purpose. However, some state governments prohibit their local 
governments from establishing or operating a formal stabilization fund. Some state 
governments impose caps on the size of local general fund balance. These policies help 
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state governments to better monitor and control local fiscal practices, but they also limit 
the roles of financial slack in local financial management.  
 For citizens, this dissertation may help them better understand their local 
governments’ financial choices and decisions. Governments are not the leviathans that by 
nature desire to accumulate slack. Government financial slack accumulation is partially 
driven by government officials’ intention to increase management capacity to respond to 
future risks and uncertainties. In addition to a cushion against risks, financial slack is also 
a convenient tool for government officials to manage expenditures and cash flows 
because the use of UFB is under their discretion. I expect these findings provide citizens 
another perspective to assess their local governments’ saving behavior and help them 
make informed decisions when they need to vote for any amendment such as California’s 
Proposition 13.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 This dissertation takes an organizational perspective and examines how financial 
slack helps government officials manage municipal finances. It does not examine the 
costs associated with financial slack accumulation. One such cost is the opportunity cost. 
Holding valuable financial resources as financial slack increases municipal governments’ 
capacity in coping with potential risks in the future, but at the same time, municipal 
governments lose the chance to use these resources to address current issues if there are 
any. This reflects the tradeoff between increasing future capacity and addressing current 
needs. Other costs include inefficiency, satisficing, and agency problems concerned by 
public choice scholars. Researchers have found that nonprofits with large endowments 
tend to show agency problems between managers and donors. Many of such nonprofits 
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pay higher salaries to their managers and spend less on programs (Core, Guay, and Verdi 
2006). Do municipal governments with more financial slack also pay more to elected 
officials (e.g. mayors, city managers, chief financial officers, etc.) or have greater 
administrative costs? This dissertation examines the effectiveness of financial slack as a 
management tool in municipal finance, but it does not address the efficiency problem. 
Without a full assessment of costs and benefits, effectiveness and efficiency, I cannot 
make a strong policy recommendation that financial slack is a good management tool for 
local governments. This is the limitation of this dissertation, but it also indicates the great 
research potential of local government financial slack in the future.  
 Another limitation of the dissertation is the lack of political factors. Most prior 
studies on municipal financial slack incorporate more or less political factors, and 
researchers find that some political factors such as forms of government and political 
conservatism have significant impacts on local financial performance and decision 
making (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005). All of these studies that incorporate political 
factors as control variables analyze samples of cities in one state or one metropolitan 
area. For a study that uses a nationwide sample of cities, it is quite challenging to 
incorporate political factors due to lack of data. Adding the state-level aggregated 
political factors to the models does not address this issue well because the state-level 
aggregated variables cannot capture the variations of impacts imposed by these political 
factors on individual cities. Nevertheless, the lack of political factors does not bias the 
empirical estimations because the generalized methods-of-moment model and the first-
differenced equation model both remove the time-invariant factors of each individual 
cities. Most of the political factors (e.g. forms of government, political conservatism, etc.) 
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can be considered as roughly time-invariant during a nine-year period. Despite there is 
not much concern on estimation bias due to lack of political factors, future studies should 
still attempt to incorporate possible political factors so that we will be able to observe 
how a particular political factor affects municipal governments’ financial slack 
accumulation and financial decision making.  
 This dissertation reveals that financial slack is not just an expenditure stabilization 
tool. It plays a lot more roles in municipal finance yet to be explored. Marlowe (2011) 
sets a good example by studying how financial slack affects local governments’ credit 
ratings. This dissertation also demonstrates an intention to explore financial slack’s 
complex roles. To improve our understanding of financial slack and to make it an 
effective and efficient policy tools, future studies should follow this path to explore the 
various roles financial slack plays in local government finance, anticipated and 
unanticipated, positive and negative.  
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